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THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
IN CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

AND GAP-FILLING:
REVILING A REVERED RELIC
HAROLD DUBROFFt

INTRODUCTION

The implied covenant of good faith contract performance has
become a fundamental concept of modern contract jurisprudence.
Originally applied in late Nineteenth Century common law
contracts cases,' the covenant gained increased acceptance when
it was incorporated into the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C.")2 and later adopted by the American Law Institute as

part of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts ("Restatement

t Professor of Law, Albany Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the
assistance of Andrew Poplinger and Nicholas Steinbock-Pratt, students at Albany
Law School, and Robert Emery, Associate Director and Research Librarian at the
Schaffer Law Library, in the preparation of this Article.
I See infra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
2 The U.C.C. was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute in 1951. U.C.C. xv (2005). The
original version of the U.C.C. had three general sections relating to good faith.
U.C.C. app. xviii §§ 1-201(19) (defining good faith: "'Good faith' means honesty in
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."); 1-203 (stating an obligation of good
faith: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance and enforcement."); 2-103(1)(b) (defining good faith for purposes of
Article 2: "'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade). Article 1
of the U.C.C. was revised in 2001. The revision changed the definition of good faith
(except for purposes of Article 5) to "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 1-201 (2004). The 2001 revision also
modified the statement of the obligation of good faith-"Every contract or duty
within [the Uniform Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance and enforcement." Id. § 1-304. Article 2 of the U.C.C. was amended in
2003 to remove the special definition of good faith for purposes of Article 2, except
that for jurisdictions adopting the amended Article 2 that had not adopted the
revised Article 1, amended Article 2 contains the same definition of good faith that is
incorporated into revised Article 1. Id. app. xx § 2-103(j).
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Second').3 Since the middle of the Twentieth Century it has
attracted the attention of scholars 4 and has become an
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
4 See generally STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD
FAITH: FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, BREACH, ENFORCEMENT 23 (1995); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.17 (3d ed. 2004); Eric G. Andersen,

Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 299 (1988); Hazel
Glenn Beh, Student Versus University: The University's Implied Obligations of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing, 59 MD. L. REV. 183 (2000); Steven J. Burton, Breach of
Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369
(1980) [hereinafter Burton, Breach of Contract]; Steven J. Burton, Good Faith in
Articles 1 and 2 of the U.C.C.: The Practice View, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1533
(1994) [hereinafter Burton, Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2]; Steven J. Burton, Good
Faith Performanceof a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
67 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Burton, Good Faith Performance]; Steven J.
Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor
Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1984) [hereinafter Burton, More on Good Faith
Performance]; Frederick W. Claybrook, Jr., Good Faith in the Termination and
Formation of Federal Contracts, 56 MD. L. REV. 555 (1997); Thomas A. Diamond &
Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating When the Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the Mystery, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 585 (1996); Claire Moore Dickerson, From Behind the Looking Glass:
Good Faith, Fiduciary Duty & Permitted Harm, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 955 (1995);
Robert Dugan, Good Faith and the Enforceability of Standardized Terms, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1 (1980); Robert Dugan, Standardized Forms: Unconscionability and
Good Faith, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 711 (1979); Russell A. Eisenberg, Good Faith
Under the Uniform Commercial Code-A New Look at an Old Problem, 54 MARQ. L.
REV. 1 (1971); E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial
Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 671
(1963) [hereinafter Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance]; Daniel Fischel, The
Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131 (1989); Barbara A. Fure, Contracts
as Literature:A Hermeneutic Approach to the Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing in Commercial Loan Agreements, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 729 (1993); Mark P.
Gergen, A Cautionary Tale About Good Faith in Texas, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1235 (1994);
Clayton P. Gillette, Limitationson the Obligationof Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619
(1981); Victor P. Goldberg, Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity Contracts:
Reining in Good Faith, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 319 (2002); Eric M. Holmes, A
Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good-Faith Disclosure in Contract
Formation, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 381 (1978); Eric M. Holmes, Is There Life After
Gilmore's Death of Contract?-Inductionsfrom a Study of Commercial Good Faith in
First-PartyInsurance Contracts, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 330 (1980); Emily M.S. Houh,
Critical Race Realism: Re-claiming the Antidiscrimination Principle Through the
Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 455 (2005); Christina L.
Kunz, Frontispiece on Good Faith: A FunctionalApproach Within the UCC, 16 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1105 (1990); William H. Lawrence & Robert D. Wilson, Good
Faith in Calling Demand Notes and in Refusing to Extend Additional Financing, 63
IND. L.J. 825 (1988); Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictionsin Search of a Standard:
The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealingin the Employment Context, 57 MO. L.
REV. 1233 (1992); Saul Litvinoff, Good Faith, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1645 (1997); Timothy
J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521
(1981); A. Brooke Overby, Bondage, Domination, and the Art of the Deal: An
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increasingly familiar issue in commercial litigation. 5
The
attention lavished on the implied covenant has not, however,
resulted in the emergence of a clear consensus on what it is. As
Judge

Posner put it,

"[t]he

. .

. cases are cryptic

as to [the

6
meaning of good faith] though emphatic about its existence."
One of the important roles perceived for the implied
covenant has been the resolution of disputes that arise after
contract formation. Such disputes generally arise when the
express contract either does not address the nature of the
dispute, or the application of the express contract language
would seem to give rise to an unfair result, which, the
disadvantaged party argues, was not contemplated when the

Assessment of Judicial Strategies in Lender Liability Good Faith Litigation, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1993); Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh
Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOWA L. REV. 503 (1991); Dennis M.
Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability and Discretionary Acceleration: Of
Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEX. L. REV. 169
(1989); James J. Stankiewicz, Good Faith Obligation in the Uniform Commercial
Code: Problems in Determining Its Meaning and Evaluating Its Effect, 7 VAL. U. L.
REV. 389 (1973); Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its
Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982) [hereinafter
Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith]; Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in
General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54
VA. L. REV. 195 (1968) [hereinafter Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract
Law]; Harvey L. Temkin, Too Much Good Faith in Real Estate Purchase
Agreements? Give Me an Option, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 43 (1985); Richard Thigpen,
Good Faith Performance Under PercentageLeases, 51 MISS. L.J. 315 (1981); Michael
P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith,40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1223 (1999); Glenn Weisenberger, Remedies for Employer's Wrongful Discharge
of an Employee Subject to Employment of an Indefinite Duration,21 IND. L. REV. 547
(1988); James J. White, Good Faith and the Cooperative Antagonist, 54 SMU L. REV.
679, 683 (2001); Joel Iglesias, Comment, Applying the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing to Franchises, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1423 (2004); Mark
Snyderman, Comment, What's So Good About Good Faith? The Good Faith
Performance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1335 (1988);
Susan A. Wegner, Comment, Section 1-208: "Good Faith"and the Need for a Uniform
Standard,73 MARQ. L. REV. 639 (1990).
5 A LEXIS search for "implied covenant w/1 good faith" from 1945 through 2004
reveals a total of 10,715 cases using the phrase.
Number of Cases from 1945 Through 2004 in Which Phrase
"Implied Covenant of Good Faith" A peared
# Cases
Years
# Cases
Years
# Cases

Years
1945-1954
1955-1964
6

11
51

1965-1974
1975-1984

80
494

1985-1994
1995-2004

Mkt. St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 1991).

3,656
6,423
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express contract language was adopted. The assertion is then
made that the party seeking to take advantage of the omission or
the unanticipated application of express contract terms is not
acting in good faith, thereby breaching the implied covenant. In
arguing and deciding these disputes based on the implied
covenant, the parties and courts frequently ignore the
fundamental question of how the meaning of the agreement
ought to be determined based on principles of interpretation and
gap-filling.
In the early stages of the development of the covenant, it
served a salutary role in affording a rationale for courts
(primarily in New York) to avoid the sometimes harsh results
that would otherwise have occurred under the conservative
interpretation and gap-filling rules prevalent in the Nineteenth
and early Twentieth Centuries, which were grounded in a
formalistic approach to contract interpretation and enforcement.
But at the same time that the implied covenant of good faith was
gaining prominence in the Twentieth Century, the process of
contract interpretation was also evolving by moving away from
formalism toward an approach based on dual realities: one,
language, because of its inherent ambiguity, cannot always
express perfectly the actual agreement of the parties, and two,
foreseeing all eventualities that may arise in contract
performance is beyond the capacity of humans and gaps in
contract provisions inevitably will arise. This newer approach to
contract interpretation, exemplified by the U.C.C. and
Restatement Second, which not only tolerates but encourages the
exercise of judicial power in facilitating contract interpretation
and enforcement, also emphasizes the context of an agreementusage, course of dealing, course of performance, and other factors
present in the relationship that gave rise to the agreement.
This Article will summarize the development of the implied
covenant of good faith and the evolution of contract
interpretation. It identifies a factor important to the
development of the implied covenant of good faith-mitigation of
the harsh results of classic contract interpretation-and suggests
that courts receptive to modern techniques of interpretation and
gap-filling should relegate the covenant to the status of a revered
relic-useful in its day, but an impediment to clear analysis of
the meaning to be ascribed to agreements. The Article will
summarize the difficulties that have been presented by various
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attempts to define good faith for purposes of the implied
covenant. These difficulties would be eliminated if cases that are
really about contract interpretation were approached that way
without regard to the issue of good faith.
It must be emphasized at the outset that the concern in this
Article is with the universal implication of a covenant of good
faith performance and enforcement as a basis for resolving
questions of contract interpretation and gap-filling.
Cases
involving good faith can arise in a variety of other contexts,
however. 7 For example, in some instances a "bad faith" breach of
contract may give rise to tort liability8 or may deprive a
breaching party of the benefits of the substantial performance
doctrine; 9 in other situations, a preliminary agreement or
agreement to agree may bind the parties to attempt in good faith
to reach a final agreement. 10 In all these cases, the question of
good faith cannot be avoided by resort to contract interpretation.
In another category of cases, good faith is mandated by law,
either because the contract expressly or impliedly confers
discretion on a party in performance or enforcement, 1 ' or as a
means to police opportunistic conduct.12
In some of these
instances, such as the obligation to exercise good faith in
requirement and output contracts, the same criticisms that are
suggested with respect to the general implied covenant of good
faith apply with equal force; that is, the good faith requirement is
simply a surrogate for the real question at issue, which is the
interpretation of the contract. In other situations, such as those
7 See Burton, Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2, supra note 4, at 1537-38; Burton,
Good FaithPerformance, supra note 4, at 18-21.
8

The tort of bad faith breach is generally restricted to cases of insurance

companies that wrongfully deny claims of the insured or unreasonably fail to settle

claims against the insured that result in liability of the insured in excess of policy
limits. See, e.g., Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103 (Cal. 1974).
9 See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 244, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921)
("The willful transgressor must accept the penalty of his transgression.").
10 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 264-69
(1987); Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673,
677-79 (1969).
11 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-305 (discussing open price to be set by seller or buyer),
2-306 (discussing requirement and output contracts), 2-311 (discussing terms of
performance to be set by one of parties); 2-712(1) (2005) (discussing buyer entitled to
cover damages in making good faith substitute purchase).
12 Id. § 2-209 cmt. 2 (providing that agreements modifying a contract need not
have consideration but must meet the test of good faith).
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in which the U.C.C. requirement of good faith for contract
modifications applies, the good faith concept is not a substitute
for contract interpretation, and the analysis suggested in this
Article is not germane. This Article is not concerned with
judging conduct once it is established that good faith is required
under the contract, as properly interpreted, or otherwise under
the circumstances; 13 instead, its concern is with a more
preliminary issue: whether good faith should be required as a
general matter without regard to questions of interpretation.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
AND FORMALIST CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

Although the notion of a good faith purchaser is traceable to
ancient times, the implication of a covenant of good faith in
contract performance is a relatively recent development in the
law of contracts, arising in the second half of the Nineteenth
Century.14 In its earliest uses, the covenant was applied to a
variety of situations in which the express contract language,
interpreted strictly, appeared to grant unbridled discretion to one
of the parties and could reduce or eliminate the other party's
contract benefits. These situations arose when the promisor's
duty was conditioned on its satisfaction with the promisee's
performance; 15 when the duty to buy or sell goods was measured
by the needs of the purchaser or the output of the seller;1 6 when
the promisor's duty to pay was dependent on when he chose to
sell property;1 7 when an insurer was granted discretion to
dispute or settle claims against the insured;1 8 when the promisor
reserved the right to interpret the contract; 19 and when the
13 Id.
14 See BURTON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 23-33; Farnsworth, Good Faith
Performance,supra note 4, at 670-71; Van Alstine, supra note 4, at 1230.
15 Balt. & Ohio R. Co. v. Brydon, 3 A. 306 (Md. 1886); Doll v. Noble, 116 N.Y.
230, 22 N.E. 406 (1889); Singerly v. Thayer, 2 A. 230 (Pa. 1886).
16 Brawley v. United States, 96 U.S. 168, 171 (1877); Loudenback Fertilizer Co.
v. Tenn. Phosphate Co., 121 F. 298 (6th Cir. 1903); Wigand v. Bachmann-Bechtel
Brewing Co., 222 N.Y. 272, 118 N.E. 618 (1918); N.Y. Cent. Ironworks Co. v. U.S.
Radiator Co., 174 N.Y. 331, 66 N.E. 967 (1903) (dictum); Genet v. President of the
Del. & Hudson Canal Co., 136 N.Y. 593, 32 N.E. 1078 (1893); Asahel Wheeler Co. v.
Mendleson, 180 A.D. 9, 167 N.Y.S. 435 (3d Dep't 1917).
17 See Simon v. Etgen, 213 N.Y. 589, 592, 107 N.E. 1066, 1066-67 (1915).
18 See Brassil v. Md. Cas. Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 239-40, 104 N.E. 622, 623-24
(1914).
19 See Indus. & Gen. Trust v. Tod, 180 N.Y. 215, 220, 73 N.E. 7, 7 (1905).
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promisor attempted to manipulate its profits so as to defeat the
promisee's rights based on the existence of such profits. 20 In all
of these cases the good faith obligation overrode the unqualified
discretion that a strict reading of the contract terms seemed to
vest in one of the parties.
In such cases, the good faith
requirement could be used to change the outcome, so that "if the
person [who reserved discretion] decide[d], not on the question
submitted, but on some question of interest or advantage not
made the basis of rights or obligations by the contract, the
decision [was] outside of the contract and [was] given no effect by
it ."21

By the early Twentieth Century, the New York Court of
Appeals had announced "a contractual obligation of universal
force ... the obligation of good faith in carrying out what is
written," 22 as well as its view that, for purposes of implying
contract terms, one would be incorrect to "suppose that one party
was to be placed at the mercy of the other."23 Then, in 1933, the
New York Court of Appeals decided Kirk La Shelle Co. v. Paul
Armstrong Co., 24 often cited as the leading early case on the
implied covenant of good faith, in which the court declared that:
[I]n every contract there is an implied covenant that neither
party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying
or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of
the contract, which means that in every contract there exists an
25
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
In Kirk La Shelle, the defendant settled a lawsuit by
agreeing to pay, to the plaintiff, half of all receipts from the
revival of a play. The settlement also gave, to the plaintiff,

See Marsh v. Masterson, 101 N.Y. 401, 404-05, 5 N.E. 59, 59-60 (1886).
Devoine Co. v. Int'l Co., 136 A. 37, 38 (Md. 1927).
22 Brassil, 210 N.Y. at 241, 104 N.E. at 624. The decision by the insurer to
defend, instead of settle within the policy limits, obligated the insurer to appeal once
a verdict over four times the policy limit was had against the insured. The insured's
rights "go deeper than the mere surface of the contract written for him by the
defendant." Id. at 242, 104 N.E. at 624. However, the court was careful to note that
"[t]he circumstances of this case are peculiar... [and w]e do not go beyond them."
Id. at 242, 104 N.E. at 624.
23 Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (1917)
(referencing nowhere an application of the implied covenant of good faith, but
demonstrating the willingness of a court to recognize the imposition, upon
contracting parties, of principles of fairness in dealing).
24 263 N.Y. 79, 188 N.E. 163 (1933).
25 Id. at 87, 188 N.E. at 167.
20

21
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approval power over all arrangements affecting the rights to the
play, except for "motion picture rights."26 At the time of the
settlement, all motion pictures were silent.
After the
development of talking motion pictures, the defendant sold, to
MGM, the talking motion picture rights to the play without
providing plaintiff with a right of approval, and without sharing
any of the revenues from the sale. The court held that talking
motion pictures could not have been within the contemplation of
the parties at the time of the settlement, and that production of
the talking motion picture reduced the value of the revival right
payments to the plaintiff. By selling these rights without the
approval of the plaintiff, the defendant breached its obligation
"not to render valueless" 27 the benefit given the plaintiff by the
contract. Accordingly, the defendant was required to hold, for
the plaintiff, the revenue received from violation of the right of
28
approval.
In 1932, one year before the decision in Kirk La Shelle, the
American Law Institute adopted Restatement of Contracts
("RestatementFirst").29 There are provisions in Restatement First
with regard to bona fide purchasers and assignees, 30 and
31
conditions based on the personal satisfaction of the promisor all of which involve the question of good faith-and there are
32
other specific references to "good faith" in Restatement First,
26 Id. at 82, 188 N.E. at 165.
27 Id. at 90, 188 N.E. at 168.
28 Id. at 85-86, 188 N.E. at 166.
29 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS viii (1932).
30 See, e.g., id. §§ 166, 488.
31 Id. § 265.
32 See, e.g., id. §§ 70 illus. 1 (effect of making or accepting a written offer),
170(2)(c) (by whom an obligor may be discharged), 173(b) (priorities between
successive assignments of the same right), 174 (an assignee who purchases a right in
good faith is not subject to latent equities), 175 illus. 3 (warranties of an assignor),
177 cmt. a (assignment of supposed rights and delegation of supposed duties), 334
illus. 6 (expense of litigation caused by breach of contract), 337 cmt. d (when interest
is recoverable as damages), 339 cmt. f (liquidated damages and penalties), 363
(damages or restitution in lieu of specific enforcement), 367 illus. 7 (effect of
unfairness, hardship, mistake, and inequitable conduct), 380 cmt. h (enforcement of
negative duties that accompany affirmative promises), 383 (effort to obtain a remedy
not in fact available), 422(1) (effect of account stated), 441 cmt. b (when one who
executes an altered document is bound), 477(a) (when fraud or misrepresentation of
a third person makes a transaction voidable), 478 cmt. a (assignment of rights under
a voidable transaction), 493(b) (methods of exercising duress), 497 cmt. b (definition
and effect of undue influence), 503 illus. 2 (mistakes by only one party, differing
mistakes of both parties), 533 (payment of expenses or for services in addition to
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but no provision of Restatement First imposes a universal
obligation of good faith in contract performance or enforcement.
In a sense, the absence of an implied covenant of good faith from
Restatement First, which embodies a formalistic approach to
contract interpretation and gap-filling, undermines a central
theme of this Article-that the covenant was inspired by the
desire of courts to soften the sometimes harsh results of
formalistic jurisprudence. Nevertheless, since only New York
and a few other states had recognized the covenant by the time
Restatement First was adopted, the omission of the covenant is
readily explained as consistent with the primary objective of
Restatement First, to set forth the then extant common law of
33
contracts.
The formalistic approach to interpretation placed great
weight on the supposed capability of language to perfectly
express the intentions of the parties as determined from the
perspective of an objective third person. 34
As such, its
application could result in disregarding the actual intention of
the parties if that intention was inconsistent with what a
reasonable third person would assume the parties intended in
light of their overt actions and words.3 5 The rationale behind this
approach was a belief that strict formalism led to consistency and
predictability-a desirable attribute in the administration of
contract law that permitted parties to arrange their affairs with
36
clear and certain expectations of legal consequences.

interest), 584(2) (bargain for separation or maintenance).
33 See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance,supra note 4, at 671 (noting that

the duty of good faith performance was applied in only a few jurisdictions, and then
generally in cases "in which one party's compensation was fixed in terms of a
percentage of the other's profits, receipts, sales or production and the obligation of
good faith was the basis of implying a condition of cooperation by the party who was
to pay"); see also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS vi ("The function of the courts is to

decide the controversies brought before them. The function of the Institute is to state
clearly and precisely in the light of the decisions the principles and rules of the
common law.").
34 See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 230 (discussing the objective third

person, or the "reasonably intelligent person," and its role in interpretation).
35 See id. § 231 illus. 2 (depicting an example of a buyer and seller agreeing
orally that, when used in their contracts, "buy" means "sell" and "sell" means "buy,"
and concluding that, absent reformation, the agreement should be interpreted in
accordance with the ordinary meaning of buy and sell).
36 See Van Alstine, supra note 4, at 1231-32 (referencing "plain meaning" and
"parol evidence" as part of the movement towards certainty and predictability).
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At the heart of the formalistic approach to contract
interpretation was "the plain meaning" rule, which was based on
two presumptions. The first was a presumption that words have
a finite number of ordinary or commonly understood meanings,
and the second was that parties intend that the words included
in their contracts be given those meanings. 37 Operating under
these presumptions allowed questions of interpretation to be
treated as questions of law not requiring factual determination
regarding the context in which the contract was formed or the
actual intentions of the parties. 38 Judge Hand's often-quoted
observation regarding the plain meaning rule was particularly
candid:
It makes not the least difference whether a promisor actually
intends that meaning which the law will impose upon his words.
The whole House of Bishops might satisfy us that he had
intended something else, and it would make not a particle of
difference in his obligation.... Hence it follows that no
declaration of the promisor as to his meaning when he used the
words is of the slightest relevancy, however formally competent
it may be as an admission. Indeed, if both parties severally
declared that their meaning had been other than the natural
meaning, and each declaration was similar, it would be
irrelevant... [and w]hen the court came to assign the meaning
to their words, it would disregard such declarations, because
they related only to their state of mind when the contract was
39
made, and that has nothing to do with their obligations.
The parol evidence rule, which applies when the parties
reach a final written agreement on some or all of the terms of the
contract, intensified the importance of the plain meaning rule by
barring proof of prior, or contemporaneous oral, agreements,
whether or not such agreements could be proved to have been

37 See id. at 1232-33 (noting that the plain meaning rule stands for the
proposition that an unambiguous writing is conclusive evidence of actual intent).
38 See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212(2) (1979) (classifying

interpretation as a question of fact only if there is an issue of credibility with respect
to extrinsic evidence, or when more than one reasonable inference can be drawn
from extrinsic evidence). Since the parol evidence rule, as applied by the formalists,
barred extrinsic evidence except where language was ambiguous on its face,
interpretation of language that had a plain meaning would be solely a question of
law for the court. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 7.14 (reiterating the position of
Restatement Second).
39 Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., 239 F. 976, 984-85 (S.D.N.Y.
1917).
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actually made. 40 As applied by the formalists, the parol evidence
rule also barred extrinsic evidence intended to interpret the
integration itself, unless a court found the writing to be
ambiguous on its face. 41 Thus, extrinsic evidence was often
barred, even when introduced to demonstrate an ambiguity in
the language of the contract. Courts would apply the plain
meaning rule, and if a court concluded that the language
employed had a plain meaning then there was no ambiguity.
Although courts acknowledged the potential injustice and
harshness of the rule, classic contract law and Restatement First
applied it rigorously as a necessary prophylactic against fraud
and faulty memories. As one court noted:
[A]pplication of the [parol evidence] rule can work to create
harsh results. However, the policies behind the rule compel its
consistent, uniform application. Commercial stability requires
that parties to a contract may rely upon its express terms
without worrying that the law will allow the other
party to
42
change the terms of the agreement at a later date.
A party relying upon the plain meaning and parol evidence
rules could seek to enforce rights that contract language, literally
interpreted, conferred upon it despite the fact that the literal
interpretation was not an accurate reflection of the actual intent
of the parties at the time of contracting. Implication of a
covenant of good faith, however, provided a justification for
courts to look beyond the plain language of an agreement to
inquire into the context of a particular bargain and determine
the actual intentions and expectations of the parties, although
they may have been expressed imperfectly. Two early New York
Court of Appeals cases provide interesting illustrations of how
changes in the common law evolve-in this case to limit the plain
meaning rule so as to achieve reasonable results without
abandoning the principles of formalistic jurisprudence. In one of
the earliest of the good faith cases, New York Central Iron Works
Co. v. United States Radiator Co.,43 the defendant was required
to fill the "entire radiator needs" of the plaintiff. When iron
See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1932).
See id. § 231; E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning"in the Law of Contracts, 76
YALE L.J. 939, 959 (1967); Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain
Meaning Rule, and the Principles of ContractualInterpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
533, 535 (1998).
42 Baker v. Bailey, 782 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Mont. 1989).
43 174 N.Y. 331, 66 N.E. 967 (1903).
40

41
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prices rose beyond the defendant's expectations, it refused to fill
the plaintiffs "needs" above those in prior years. Interpreting
the contract language under the plain meaning rule, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs "needs" consisted of all radiators
that it could sell at a profit. Nevertheless, it stated in dictum
that, had the defendant properly raised the issue, it could have
defended on the grounds that the plaintiff was not acting in good
faith in attempting to exploit market conditions that were beyond
the contemplation of the parties when the contract was formed:
[W]e do not mean to assert that the plaintiff had the right,
under the contract, to order goods to any amount. Both parties
in such a contract are bound to carry it out in a reasonable way.
The obligation of good faith and fair dealing towards each other
is implied in every contract of this character. The plaintiff could
not use the contract for the purpose of speculation in a rising
rights
market, since that would be a plain abuse of the
44
conferred, and something like a fraud upon the seller.
The court cited no authority for its view that bad faith contract
enforcement was "something like a fraud."
In the later case of Kirk La Shelle Co. v. PaulArmstrong Co.,
the court took a different approach. It did not address the
question whether "motion picture rights" had a plain meaning
that favored the defendant, but it did not deny such plain
meaning. The court was, however, persuaded that when the
parties entered into their contract they did not contemplate the
development of talking motion pictures. The court was further
convinced that to adopt the defendant's position would enable the
defendant to deprive the plaintiff of the benefits of its bargain.
How then to reach a just result without questioning the
underlying validity of the plain meaning rule? The court found
its answer in the same source as it did in its earlier famous
decision in Lawrence v. Fox 45-the law of trusts: "By entering
into the contract and accepting and retaining the consideration
therefor, the respondents assumed a fiduciary relationship which
had its origin in the contract, and which imposed upon them the
46
duty of utmost good faith."

44

Id.

at 335, 66 N.E. at 968.

45 20 N.Y. 268, 274 (1859).
46 Kirk La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 85, 188 N.E. 163, 166

(1933).
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Prior to the adoption of the U.C.C., some two decades after
the promulgation of Restatement First, the common law of most
states had not yet recognized a general implied covenant of good
faith. 47 In fact, at that time, the covenant was still largely the
creation of the common law of New York, a jurisdiction not noted
for its liberal approach to contract interpretation and the parol
For this reason, the U.C.C. represented a
evidence rule.
watershed in the history of the implied covenant because of its
inclusion of a general implied covenant of good faith-"Every
contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good
The implied
faith in its performance or enforcement." 48
obligation of good faith ultimately then became part of the
statutory commercial law of every state. Equally significant, in
the half century following promulgation of the U.C.C., the
implied covenant has been accepted as part of the common law of
49
most states.
II. MODERN CONTRACT INTERPRETATION AND
ITS APPLICATION TO GOOD FAITH CASES

Contrary to the formalism of classic contract law and
Restatement First, the approach to contract interpretation and
gap-filling prescribed by Restatement Second and the U.C.C. is
more concerned with arriving at the actual agreement of the
parties, or where there is no such agreement, construing the
contract in a manner that is fair and reasonable under the
This approach, championed by Twentieth
circumstances.
Century scholars and judges such as Professors Corbin 50 and
Llewellyn,5 1 and Judges Clark 52 and Traynor, 53 recognized that
the complexities of human relationships and motivations often
required factual inquiry into the actual intentions of contracting
See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance,supra note 4, at 671.
U.C.C. § 1-203 (2005).
49 See Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 4, at 404 (listing the
overwhelming number of jurisdictions that recognize a general duty of good faith in
contractual obligations).
50 Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretationof Words and the Parol Evidence Rule,
50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 162-64 (1965).
51 K.N. Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47 YALE L.J.
1243, 1264 (1938).
52 See Parev Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 124 F.2d 147, 149-51 (2d Cir.
1941).
53 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d
641, 644-45 (Cal. 1968).
47
48
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parties, consideration of the context in which contracts were
formed, and a willingness to overtly exercise judicial power to
resolve
disputes,
based
on
court
determinations
of
reasonableness, where the parties had not considered or reached
agreement on situations arising after contract formation.
Restatement Second and the U.C.C. have by no means
54
abandoned objectivity in contract interpretation and gap-filling,
but an objective determination of the meaning of contract terms
is made upon an examination of the context of the bargain,
permitting exploration into the subjective intent of the parties
and the circumstances attendant to the particular contract at
issue. 55 This approach rejects the assumption that the meaning
of contract language, not ambiguous on its face, can be
determined without regard to consideration of the context in
which it is used. 56 Although they share a common philosophy on
contract interpretation and construction, Restatement Second
specifically incorporates "standards" of interpretation not found
in the U.C.C.
Under these standards, the primary focus is on
determining what a party knows or should know regarding the
intended meaning of the other party. The results of two primary
inquiries in the interpretation process determine the meaning to
be ascribed to the language of a contract. The first inquiry is
whether both parties intended the same meaning for the terms of
their contract, whether or not in accordance with the plain
meaning of those terms. If the answer to this question is
affirmative, then the meaning ascribed to the terms is that
intended by the parties.5 8 Restatement Second acknowledges that
this standard is a rejection of the general approach to contract
59
interpretation of Restatement First.
A case that anticipated Restatement Second's approach is
Berke Moore Co., Inc. v. Phoenix Bridge Co., 60 in which a contract
between a general contractor and a subcontractor provided that
the subcontractor would pave a bridge at a set rate per square
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 cmt. a (1979).
See id. § 201 cmt. b.
56 See id.; see also U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (2005).
57 Cases controlled by the U.C.C. may be subject to common law standards of
interpretation that are not displaced by the particular U.C.C. provisions. U.C.C. § 1103 (b).
58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(1).
59 Id. § 201 reporter's note.
54
55

60

98 A.2d 150 (N.H. 1953).
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yard measured by the "concrete surface included in the bridge
deck." 61 The subcontractor brought suit for damages, claiming
that the surface area by which the square yardage was to be
measured included all of the outer surfaces as opposed to just the
area on the upper bridge deck, as the general contractor asserted.
Although the court acknowledged that a literal interpretation of
the contract language favored the subcontractor, 62 it found that,
at the time the contract was entered into, both parties intended
that the square yardage be measured by the upper surface of the
bridge deck only, and enforced the contract accordingly.
If it cannot be shown that both parties intended the same
meaning of the contract language, then under Restatement
Second's standards of interpretation it is necessary to move on to
the second inquiry, which asks whether either party knew or had
reason to know of the meaning intended by the other party. If
Party A knew or had reason to know of the meaning intended by
Party B, and Party B did not know or have reason to know of the
meaning intended by Party A, then Party B's meaning controls
the interpretation of the contract. 63 Here, although the contract
will be interpreted as only one of the parties intended, the other's
intention is ignored merely in the sense that the contract will not
be applied as it desired. But ignoring such other party's desired
intention is justified on the basis that its knowledge (or reason to
have knowledge) was superior to that of the first party. Revisit
the basic facts of Berke Moore for an illustration: had the
subcontractor known of the contractor's intention for the term to
include the upper bridge deck only, and had the contractor lacked
knowledge, or reason to know, of the subcontractor's intention,
then the contract would be interpreted to require payment based
upon the surface area of the upper bridge deck only.
Restatement Second and the U.C.C also differ from
formalism with respect to the relationship of the parol evidence
rule to the resolution of ambiguity.
Under the formalistic
approach, extrinsic evidence offered to interpret an integrated
agreement was inadmissible unless the court, as a matter of law,
found that the language of the agreement was ambiguous. 64 In
determining whether an ambiguity existed, formalist courts
61
62

Id. at 151.
Id. at 153.

63

Id.

64

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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applied the plain meaning rule. 65 Use of the plain meaning rule
could preclude parties' actual intentions from determining the
interpretation of their language. Restatement Second and the
U.C.C. take a more liberal approach in resolving ambiguities,
often looking to extrinsic evidence of context in determining
whether an ambiguity exists. 66 Restatement Second explicitly
acknowledges the inherent uncertainty of linguistic meaning and
67
the capacity of contextual factors to reduce such uncertainty.
Chief Justice Traynor adopted this more liberal approach in the
famous case (or infamous in the view of some who still cling to
the formalistic approach), 68 Pacific Gas & Electric Co., Inc. v.
G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., Inc.,69 in which he
explained the proper approach to resolving contract ambiguity:
The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the
meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to
the court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether
the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to
which the language of the instrument is reasonably
susceptible ...[because]

limit[ing] the determination of the

meaning of a written instrument to its four corners... would
either deny the relevance of [party intentions] or presuppose a
degree of verbal precision and stability our language has not
attained....
...[R]ational interpretation requires at least a preliminary

consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the
intention of the parties ....

If the court decides, after

considering this evidence, that the language of a contract, in the
light of all the circumstances, "is fairly susceptible of either one
65

See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying

text (discussing Steuart v.

McChesney, 444 A.2d 659 (Pa. 1982)).
66 U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 1 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(c)
cmt. b (1979); see also 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 579
(1960).
67

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 cmts. a, b.

For a particularly strident and unfair criticism of Judge Traynor's approach,
see Trident Center. v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th
Cir. 1988) (interpreting Pacific Gas to leave all contracts, no matter how clearly
written, susceptible to being undermined by parol evidence). In writing his opinion
in Trident Center, Judge Kozinski either overlooked or chose to disregard Justice
Traynor's limitation that parol evidence may only be offered to support an
interpretation of which the contract language was reasonably susceptible. Judge
Kozinski repeated this error in Wilson Arlington Co. v. PrudentialInsurance Co. of
America, 912 F.2d 366, 370 (9th Cir. 1990).
69 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
68
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of the two interpretations contended for," extrinsic 7evidence
0
relevant to prove either of such meanings is admissible.
Although the formalistic approach to contract law recognized
that operative usages could vary the plain meaning of contract
language or even add to the agreement provisions in accordance
71
with usages that are "not inconsistent with the agreement,"
Restatement Second and the U.C.C. go further. They permit
other contextual factors not recognized by Restatement Firstcourse of dealing and course of performance-to be given greater
72
weight than usage in determining a contract's meaning.
Perhaps even more importantly, the U.C.C. has been interpreted
by
some
courts
to
allow
such
contextual
factors,
"unless ... carefully negated," 73 to be given effect even if they are
"seemingly contradictory" to the express terms of the
75
agreement] 4 Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., Inc.
provides a striking example of the power of contextual factors in
modern contract interpretation.
Nanakuli was a paving
contractor that had a long-term requirements contract with Shell
Oil for the supply of asphalt. The contract, a fully integrated
writing, 76 provided that the price Nanakuli would pay for asphalt
would be "Shell's Posted Price at time of delivery." 77 No dispute
existed as to the determination of Posted Price under the
contract. Rather, Nanakuli complained that Shell failed to "price
protect": Shell increased its Posted Price after Nanakuli
committed itself to fixed-price paving contracts and before Shell
delivered the asphalt Nanakuli needed to perform such
contracts.78 No mention of price protection was made in the
written contract, but at trial, Nanakuli was allowed to introduce
70 Id. at 644-46 (quoting Balfour v. Fresno Canal & Irrigation Co., 41 P. 876,
877 (Cal. 1895)).
71 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 246 (1932).

72 U.C.C. § 1-303(e) (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(b).
73 U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2.
74 Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 780 (9th Cir.
1981); accord Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 9 (4th Cir. 1971);
Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc. v. Securalloy Co., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 801, 803-04
(D. Conn. 1970). But see S. Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc., 407
F. Supp. 581, 583-84 (N.D. Ga. 1975), af'd, 569 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1978)
(unpublished opinion); Div. of Triple T Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720,
731-32, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191, 202-04 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1969).
75 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981).
76 Id. at 782 n.14.
77 Id. at 780.
78 Id. at 777.
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evidence of usage and course of performance to support its
position that Shell was required to price protect. 79 A jury verdict
for Nanakuli was set aside by the trial judge, who granted Shell's
motion for judgment n.o.v. In the course of vacating the trial
judge's decision and reinstating the jury verdict, the Ninth
Circuit held: one, the agreement of the parties under the U.C.C.
is broader than the express contract and may include contextual
factors such as usage and course of performance; 80 two, such
contextual factors may add to the terms of even a fully integrated
writing; 8 1 and three, contextual factors give way to the express
terms of the agreement only if such factors would constitute a
"complete negation" of the express terms. In Nanakuli, the court
held that only usage and course of performance evidence tending
to prove that the "buyer was to set the price" would completely
82
negate the contract's express terms.
Analytically
distinct from cases that involve the
interpretation of express contract language are those in which no
express contract provisions address situations or controversies
that arise after contract formation. The latter class includes, for
example, cases in which an otherwise binding contract omits a
term prescribing the time for performance or payment. Such
omissions cause conceptual problems for the devout formalist
whose philosophy rejects the power of courts to make contracts
for the parties. The logic of such a view would seem to require
the court to decline to enforce the claimed contract.
Nevertheless, courts, whether implicitly or explicitly, and
regardless of their jurisprudential philosophy of contract law,
acknowledge the impracticality (due to transaction costs) and the
impossibility (due to the limits of human imagination in
foreseeing the future) of producing an all-encompassing, express
agreement.
Thus, at least since the Eighteenth Century,
83
contract law has always allowed for filling gaps in contracts.
The differences between the approach of the formalists, on the
one hand, and Restatement Second and the U.C.C. on the other,
have to do with the theory and technique for gap-filling, and

79 See id. at 793-94.
80 See id. at 794-95.

See id. at 795.
Id. at 805.
See E. Allan Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omissions in Contracts, 68 COLUM.
L. REV. 860, 862-68 (1968).
81
82
83
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more importantly, the types of gaps that may be filled. The
traditional approach to gap-filling relied on either strained
interpretations of contract language or implication of contract
terms based on the presumed intention of the parties. 8 4 In this
manner, courts could enforce gap-ridden express contracts
without acknowledging that they were, in fact, making contracts
for the parties.8 5 The technique for gap-filling usually involved
no more than stating conclusively what the parties' presumed
intention was. Frequently, such presumed intent was by no
means self-evident.8 6 With regard to the scope of gap-filling, the
traditional approach was to identify particular categories of gaps
(performance time, payment time, impossibility, frustration, etc.)
that could be filled, and to draw the line at other types of gaps
(most importantly, price) that could never be filled regardless of
the parties' intention to be bound.8 7 For example, in Martin
Deli v. Schumacher,8 8 the New York Court of Appeals refused to
enforce an option to renew a lease that provided for rent "to be
agreed upon" notwithstanding the parties' intent for the
provision to be legally binding. The court's rationale was a clear
statement of the formalist philosophy:
[A] contract is a private "ordering" in which a party binds
himself to do, or not to do, a particular thing. This liberty is no
right at all if it is not accompanied by freedom not to contract.
The corollary is that, before one may secure redress in our
courts because another has failed to honor a promise, it must
appear that the promisee assented to the obligation in question.

84

See id. (providing an extensive history of gap-filling).

See id. at 862 ("It is [a] commonplace that a court should not 'make the
contract for the parties.' ")
86 For example, in the famous case of Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 122 Eng. Rep.
309 (Q.B.), the court implied a term that the owner of a music hall was discharged
from its obligation to make the music hall available to a licensee when the music
hall was destroyed by fire. Although acknowledging that the parties had not thought
about the possibility of the fire when forming the contract, and that the obligation of
the owner was absolute on its face, the court justified its result as carrying out what
the intention of the parties would have been had they thought about the possibility
of destruction. Of course, it cannot be known how the parties would have addressed
the issue had it occurred to them, but it seems just as likely that they would have
agreed to some sharing of the licensee's reliance costs, or some other arrangement,
where the contract became impossible to perform without the fault of either party,
but one or both parties had sustained out-of-pocket losses.
87 See Farnsworth, supra note 83, at 864-66.
88 52 N.Y.2d 105, 417 N.E.2d 541, 436 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1981).
85
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It also follows that, before the power of law can be invoked to
enforce a promise, it must be sufficiently certain and specific so
that what was promised can be ascertained. Otherwise, a court,
in intervening, would be imposing its own conception of what
the parties should or might have undertaken, rather than
confining itself to the implementation of a bargain to which they
have mutually committed themselves. Thus, definiteness as to
material matters is of the very essence in contract law.
89
Impenetrable vagueness and uncertainty will not do.
The approach exemplified by Martin is at odds, at least in
spirit, with section 204 of Restatement Second,90 which provides
broad power to courts to fill gaps with terms that comport "with
community standards of fairness and policy," 91 and with section
2-204(3) of the U.C.C., which provides that a contract does not
fail for indefiniteness if the parties intended to be bound, and
that the court will provide "open" terms "if there is a reasonably
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." 92 With regard to
an open price term, the U.C.C. provides generally that if a
contract is concluded with an open price term that is not
otherwise fixed, the price will be a reasonable price at the time
for delivery.9 3 Restatement Second and the U.C.C. thus dispense
with implication of gap-filling terms based on the presumed
intent of the parties in favor of an approach that first looks to
whether the parties intended to be bound and then fills gaps
based on reasonableness. Moreover, no particular types of gaps
are off limits, including gaps resulting from invalidating a
94
contract provision.
The modern approach to contract interpretation and gapfilling, then, allows for a larger scope of judicial intervention
when language is missing or is susceptible to more than one
interpretation. A somewhat different question is presented by
cases in which the language of the contract appears to be clear
89 Id. at 109, 417 N.E.2d at 543, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 249 (citations omitted).

90 "When the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not
agreed with respect to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights
and duties, a term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the
court." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1979).

91 Id. § 204 cmt. d.
92 U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2005).
93 Id. § 2-305.
94 See, e.g., A.N. Deringer, Inc. v. Strough, 103 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 1996)
(invalidating an overbroad geographical limitation on competition; court will supply
"reasonable" limitation).
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and complete, yet common sense strongly suggests that the
parties did not envision the particular circumstances that
actually arose and would have used different language had they
done so. Formalism, applying the plain meaning rule and the
parol evidence rule, had little difficulty resolving such cases even
96
though the resolution could be absurd. 95 Steuart v. McChesney,
a 1982 decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, provides a
fine example of the potential for absurdity. The Steuarts had
granted to the McChesneys a right of first refusal on a parcel of
land. The right was to be triggered by a bona fide purchaser
making an offer to the Steuarts. The price to be paid, however,
was not linked to the offer received, but to the property's "market
value" according to its assessed value for real estate taxation
purposes at the time of the bona fide offer. 97 When the Steuarts
received offers, the McChesneys tendered an amount equal to the
assessed value, which was approximately one-fourth the amount
of the bona fide offers received by the Steuarts. The tax rolls had
not been updated for five years, and the Steuarts brought an
action seeking either to cancel the McChesneys' right, or to have
the agreement interpreted to make the price of exercising the
98
option equal to either the bona fide offers or fair market value.
The trial court concluded that the formula based on assessed
value was intended as "a mutual protective minimum price for
the premises rather than to be the controlling price without
regard to a market third party offer" and required the
McChesneys to pay a price equal to the highest bona fide offer if
they wished to exercise their right of first refusal. 99 The
Supreme Court, however, relying on the plain meaning rule and
its conclusion that "a more clear and unambiguous expression of
the Right of First Refusal's exercise price would be onerous to

95 In certain limited, and clearly marked off categories of cases, such as
impossibility and frustration, formalism offered relief from the plain and supposedly

absolute terms of the contract. Relief was based on the supposed, unstated intent of
the parties. Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B.). However, in cases
not falling into these categories, the plain meaning rule was applicable unless, of
course, a court felt like providing relief based on the good faith doctrine. See supra
notes 24-28, 45-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kirk La Shelle Co. v.
Paul Armstrong Co.
96 444 A.2d 659 (Pa. 1982).
97 Id. at 660.
98 Id. at 661.

99 Id.
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conceive' 100 permitted the McChesneys to buy the property for
twenty-five percent of its value. Apparently, the court was
unmoved by the seeming internal contradiction in the contract
language 1 0'-value according to the "assessment rolls" was far
less than "market value." The court's approach was, however,
consistent with formalist dogma that ambiguities in integrated
agreements must be patent in order for parol evidence to be
introduced. 10 2 Steuart v. McChesney was decided in 1982. Had it
been decided 100 (or more) years earlier it would not be so
remarkable. It stands as a caution to those inclined to believe
that the common law evolves at a uniform pace in all places.10 3
Courts, influenced by, or influencing, principles of
interpretation found in the Restatement Second and the U.C.C.,
take a different view of cases in which the most obvious
interpretation of the contract language conflicts with what the
parties actually intended or could be supposed to have intended.
Nanakuli could be cited as an example of such a view. "Posted
Price at time of delivery" apparently covered the entire universe
of pricing questions. Yet without determining that the contract
language was either ambiguous or suffered from an obvious
omission, the court used the contextual factors of usage and
course of performance to, in effect, recognize a gap that could be
100Id. at 663.
101The agreement provided:

During the lifetime of said Steuarts, should said Steuarts obtain a Bona
Fide Purchaser for Value, the said McChesneys may exercise their right to
purchase said premises at a value equivalent to the market value of the
premises according to the assessment rolls as maintained by the County of
Warren and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the levying and assessing
of real estate taxes ....
Id. at 660 (quoting agreement) (emphasis added).
102 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
103 Another relatively modern case following the approach of Steuart v.
McChesney is Lewis v. Carnaggio,183 S.E.2d 899 (S.C. 1971), in which a landowner
had contracted with a builder for the construction of a house. Evidence was
introduced that the owner had intended on spending no more than $34,500, and
insisted on such language in the contract. Id. at 900. The chosen builder drew up a
contract from a form book, and the pertinent language read "'the owners shall not
be required.., to pay to the contractor any amount in excess of the sum of [$34,500]
which is the estimated cost of construction, plus the fee provided for herein.'" Id.
(quoting agreement). The clear grammatical import of the comma, held the court,
was to separate the payment cap term from the term requiring the payment of the
contractor's fee. Id. Although this decision was sensible from a grammatical
standpoint, a review of the facts surrounding the case indicated that this was not in
fact what the parties intended. Id. at 901 (Littlejohn, J., dissenting).
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filled. Of course, the result in Nanakuli was based on specific
provisions of the U.C.C. that permit even fully integrated
contracts to be supplemented by usage and course of
performance. But even where no statutory authority exists to
vary the "plain meaning" of contract language, courts will do so
based on common law principles of interpretation and gap-filling
where such language is clearly at odds with parties' expectations.
This was the situation in Spaulding v. Morse,10 4 in which a trust
agreement provided that the divorced husband would pay child
support for his son until the son completed four years of college.
The son, who finished high school in early 1946, was immediately
inducted into the Army, and the husband ceased paying support.
The trust provided that the trustee would turn over the support
payments to the mother " 'to be applied by her or the trustee
upon or toward the maintenance and education of [the son], so
long as she shall maintain and educate [the son] to the
satisfaction of said trustee.'-105 In construing the legal effect of
the trust instrument, the Massachusetts court quoted from an
earlier case dealing with contract interpretation:
Every instrument in writing is to be interpreted, with a view to
the material circumstances of the parties at the time of the
execution, in the light of the pertinent facts within their
knowledge and in such manner as to give effect to the main end
designed to be accomplished.... An omission to express an
But if the
intention cannot be supplied by conjecture.
instrument as a whole produces a conviction that a particular
result was fixedly desired although not expressed by formal
words, that defect may be supplied by implication and the
underlying intention... may be effectuated, provided it is
sufficiently declared by the entire instrument. 106
Considering the evident purpose of the trust to provide support
for the son when he was in the custody of his mother and in
college, the court held that the obligation to pay child support
would be suspended so long as the son was in the Army.
Restatement Second supports Spaulding v. Morse, providing in
section 202(1) that "[w]ords and other conduct are interpreted in
the light of all the circumstances, and if the principal purpose of

104
105
106

76 N.E.2d 137 (Mass. 1947).
Id. at 138 (quoting agreement).
Id. at 139 (quoting Dittemore v. Dickey, 144 N.E. 57, 60 (Mass. 1924)).
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the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight."'10 7 A
comment to this section goes on to provide that "[e]ven language
which is otherwise explicit may be read with a modification
needed to make it consistent with" a common principal purpose
of the parties. 0
Putting aside for the present the issue whether a good faith
obligation ought to be implied even though doing so is
inconsistent with party intent at the time of formation, it seems
clear that most of the cases that have been resolved based on the
implied covenant could have been decided based on modern
notions of interpretation and gap-filling. These cases largely
arise when express terms of the contracts either do not address
the subject of the dispute that ultimately arises, or, although
literally applying to the question raised by the dispute, were not
adopted with the dispute in mind. An example of the latter
situation is the leading good faith case of Kirk La Shelle Co. v.
Paul Armstrong Co.'0 9
Given his view that language is
frequently ambiguous, and even in the case of completely
integrated agreements evidence can be introduced to determine
the meaning given such language by the parties,"1 0 Justice
Traynor might well have allowed the plaintiff to prove that the
parties intended the term "motion pictures" to apply only to those
movie formats (i.e., silent pictures) that were unlike play
productions because of the absence of spoken dialogue. From this
it would follow that the royalty exclusion provision should not
apply to talking pictures. Alternatively, a court applying modern
notions of gap-filling could begin its analysis with a
determination that, because the parties did not imagine the
invention of talking pictures when they entered into their
agreement, a gap existed as to how the agreement should apply
to talking pictures. Considering such factors as the purpose of
107 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(1) (1979).
108 Id. § 202 cmt. c. The facts of Spaulding v. Morse form the basis for
illustration 4 to section 202. Id. § 202 cmt. 2, illus. 4.
109 263 N.Y. 79, 188 N.E. 163 (1933) (holding the parties did not contemplate the
development of talking motion pictures when entering into the contract); see also
supra notes 24-28 and 45-46 and accompanying text.
110 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., Inc., 442 P.2d
641, 644 (Cal. 1968) (noting a rule requiring a court to look only at the words of the
contract itself without reference to the party's intention merely because the court
deems the document unambiguous "would either deny the relevance of the intention
of the parties or presuppose a degree of verbal precision and stability our language

has not attained").
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the agreement and whether the talking picture royalties would
reduce or be in addition to the anticipated dramatic production
royalties when the agreement was entered into, the court could
fill the gap based on notions of fairness. The results of these
divergent approaches might not be the same, but neither of them
would require the court to determine whether good faith should
require the payment of the royalty.
Other good faith cases, which do not involve the question of
interpretation of express contract language, may arise because
one party appears to have discretion to act in a way that affects
the rights of the other.
Such discretion may be explicitly
reserved by the terms of the contract. A partial listing of such
contracts include: requirement/output contracts in which one
party determines a requirement or output that the other is bound
to supply or buy; contracts that condition a promisor's duty on
being "satisfied" with the performance of the promisee; contracts,
such as employment or franchise arrangements, that give one
party a right to terminate the contract "at any time"; contracts
that give one party the right to determine its time to perform or
to set other contract terms, including price; contracts that relieve
the promisor of a duty based on the nonoccurrence of a condition;
and loan arrangements that give a lender the apparent
unrestricted right (such as with a demand loan) to require
immediate repayment or to refuse to make future advances. On
the other hand, the reservation of discretion may not be explicit
in the contract, but instead may arise because the contract does
not address situations in which actions of one of the parties can
affect the rights of the other. Cases in which the promisee's
compensation is dependent on the efforts or other activities of the
promisor but which fail to create a standard for such efforts or
activities constitute a prime example of this class of cases. These
cases may involve contracts for the sale, lease, or licensing of
property in exchange for a share of the revenue generated from
such property by the promisor, but the agreement fails to specify
a level of effort required of the promisor, nor does it forbid the
promisor from diverting its attention to other activities that
reduce such revenue. 111
In all of these cases, instead of seeking guidance in the

111 For a comprehensive review of good faith cases described above (as well as
others), see BURTON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, chs. 3-4, 7.
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implied covenant of good faith, courts could inquire into the
particular background facts to determine whether the parties
shared a common understanding of how the discretion would be
exercised, and if not, whether one of the parties had an
expectation that the other party knew or should have known
about, as revealed by negotiation, trade usage, course of dealing,
course of performance, or other factors. If based on this analysis
neither party is chargeable with a gap-filler favorable to the
other party, the court could resort to gap-filling based on
principles of fairness in the particular situation, or alternatively
could conclude that no gap deserving of filling exists. Instead the
court could apply the express terms of the contract literally.
It may be argued that the approach advocated here is, in
substance, no different from the approach taken by courts
applying a good faith standard, and all that is at stake is
whether to label a case as an "interpretation or gap-filling" case
or a "good faith" case. Although such an argument has some
validity, two critical differences between these approaches exist.
First, as will be seen in the next section of this Article, there are
profound differences of opinion with respect to the definition and
scope of "good faith." These differences are evident in the
writings of scholars as well as in the U.C.C. and Restatement
Second. Although these differences have not played a major role,
at least overtly, in deciding cases, 112 they nevertheless create an
environment for deciding cases that may be unnecessarily vague
and rootless. Principles of interpretation and gap-filling, on the
other hand, are more precise and give better guidance to courts
and contracting parties. Second, and more importantly, whether
a court approaches a case as a question of good faith or as a
question of interpretation may affect its outcome. This issue,
also, will be explored in the next section, but an illustration here
may be useful.
In Fortune v. National Cash Register, Co., 11 3 a salesman was
employed under a written agreement that provided for part of his
112 One of the few cases that have explored the differences between competing
conceptualizations of good faith is Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187,
191 (N.H. 1989), in which Justice Souter (then a member of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court) discussed the differences between the approach to good faith taken
by Professors Burton and Summers. Although he concluded that New Hampshire
had adopted Professor Summers' view on good faith, he also said that the result in
the case would be the same under Professor Burton's view. Id. at 191, 194-96.
113 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).

20061

IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH

compensation to be based on sales to customers in his territory.
The right to commissions did not automatically vest when the
sale was made, but depended on future circumstances, including
whether the salesman was employed at the time of delivery. The
written agreement specifically reserved to both the employer and
the employee the right to terminate the employment without
cause upon written notice. A large sale was made to a customer
in the employee's territory, and therefore credited to the
employee, but he was reassigned within the company and then
fired in a way that substantially reduced his commissions under
the agreement. Consistent with the cause of action pleaded by
the plaintiff, the trial judge asked the jury to determine whether
the employment was terminated in bad faith,' 14 and in this
connection instructed the jury that the employer would have
acted in bad faith had it terminated the employment for the
purpose of avoiding payment of any part of the commission that
would otherwise have been due. 115 The jury verdict was in favor
of the employee. Reserving the question whether the implied
covenant of good faith applied to all employment contracts, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the jury
instruction and verdict on the ground that good faith is required
to terminate an at-will employee who is entitled to compensation
for work performed. 116 Since Fortune was pleaded and tried
solely as a good faith case, the court did not approach the case on
the basis of standards of interpretation and gap-filling. Had it
done so, the key question would have been the resolution of the
conflicting contractual terms which, on the one hand, provided a
right to commissions to the employee, but on the other, provided
a right to terminate to the employer. The court then would have
turned its attention, as the same court did in Spaulding v. Morse,
to which of the conflicting provisions should have priority. Its
analysis could then have been guided by the standards of
interpretation and gap-filling adopted by Restatement Second,
determining: 1) whether the employee knew or had reason to
know that the employer reserved the right to terminate his
employment so as to reduce commissions;1 1 7 2) if the employee
114

Id. at 1255.

Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 349 N.E.2d 350, 352 n.4 (Mass. App. Ct.
1976), rev'd, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
116 Fortune, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
117 Presumably, this would be a question of fact, and if the employee knew or
115
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did not know or have reason to know, whether the employer
knew or had reason to know that its right to terminate was not
understood by the employee as being exercisable in order to save
commissions; 118 and 3) if neither the employer nor the employee
knew or had reason to know of the interpretation intended by the
other, under what circumstances the employer could fairly and
reasonably discharge the employee with the effect of reducing the
employee's compensation. 119 Employee misconduct, financial
exigencies of the cmployer, decline in Fortune's productivity,
payment of the commission to another employee, 120 and
of
examples
some
are
reorganizations
departmental
circumstances that might justify termination even if commissions
were thereby reduced or eliminated.
Would Fortune have come out differently had the defendant
argued that contract interpretation rather than good faith should
control? That question cannot be answered, but it is clear, at
least, that the assignment of questions of fact and law would be
of a different dimension if the case were analyzed as an
interpretation case rather than a good faith case. Moreover, it is
submitted that the interpretation approach to the case offers a
principled basis for determining the agreement of the parties,
while the good faith approach to the case invites the court to
simply state conclusively a rule that seems proper to the
had reason to know, the employer should win. In Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d
1145, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1984), Justice Scalia supposed that it "would require a degree
of folly ... we are not inclined to posit" that commission salespersons would agree to
a provision giving unlimited discretion to an employer to retroactively reduce their
commissions. The conclusion that an employee would never agree to such a term
seems flawed. For example, the employee could be aware that despite the fact that
the employer reserved unlimited discretion, the employer had never in the past
exercised such discretion so as to deprive an employee of commissions, and the
employee was willing to risk not being the first victim of such discretion; the
employee could believe that the employer would be constrained to exercise the
discretion so as not to create low morale among other employees, or the employee
might believe that the employer would not exercise the discretion in his or her case
because the employee would then quit and the employer would lose a valuable
salesperson.
11s This would also be a question of fact, and if this was the case then the
employee should win.
119 This inquiry would be employed to determine how to fill the gap, and would
be a question for the court, except to the extent that the existence or nonexistence of
the circumstances raised questions of fact.
120 National Cash Register paid twenty-five percent of the commissions on the
order credited to Fortune to another employee, and to that extent was not enriched
by the termination. Fortune,364 N.E.2d at 1254.
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individual judge.
III. THE VARIoUS FACES OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
This section will examine various attempts to determine the
role of the implied covenant of good faith as well as its content.
Commentators are at odds about these questions, and given the
state of the case law and the law as represented by the U.C.C.
and Restatement Second, it is not surprising that application of
the covenant can be a confusing and unsatisfying business.
A. Using the Covenant to Imply Terms
The late Professor E. Allan Farnsworth of Columbia
University was an early commentator on the implied covenant of
good faith. 121 His most important article on the subject examined
the covenant as contained in the U.C.C. He criticized the
definition of good faith in Article 1 of the U.C.C. as too restrictive
because it provided for judging conduct based solely on the
honesty of the actor and did not include a requirement of
reasonableness, as was required by Article 2 in the case of
merchants. 122 In the course of his critique he observed that the
chief use of the covenant was as a "rationale" for a court to imply
contract terms necessary to "secure the expected benefits of the
'1 2 4
contract"' 23 to a party or to protect "reasonable expectations."
Limiting good faith to an inquiry into actual honesty would
frustrate this use, since the sole question would then be one of
fact for the jury, not the court. Professor Farnsworth was not
particularly disturbed by the vagueness of the doctrine of good
faith as a device to protect reasonable expectations since "[p]art
of the strength of such general concepts as 'good faith' and

121 FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 7.17; E. Allan Farnsworth, Duties of Good

Faith and Fair Dealing Under the UNIDROIT Principles, Relevant International
Conventions, and National Laws, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47 (1995); Farnsworth,

Good Faith Performance, supra note 4; E. Allan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep
One's Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 8
(1984) (distinguishing best efforts from good faith); E. Allan Farnsworth,
Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed
Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1987); E. Allan Farnsworth, The Concept of
Good Faith in American Law (1993), available at http://w3.uniromal.it/idc/centro/
publications/lOFarnsworth.pdf.
122 Farnsworth, Good FaithPerformance,supra note 4, at 671-72.
123 Id. at 672.
124 Id. at 669.
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'commercial reasonableness' lies in an elasticity and lack of
precision that permits them to be, in the language of the Code's
own comments, 'developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen
and new circumstances and practices.' "125
Contract law (at least as expressed in the U.C.C. and
Restatement Second) has moved away from the rigid formalism of
the plain meaning rule and a restrictive parol evidence rule and
toward recognition of a more expansive role for the courts in
interpreting contracts and filling gaps. In light of this evolution,
Professor Farnsworth's observation that "the chief utility" of good
faith performance has been to imply contract terms, leads one to
question whether such a rationale remains valid. The case of
Market Street Associates v. Frey126 is instructive in answering
this question. There, the owner of real estate entered into a saleleaseback transaction with the General Electric Pension Trust.
Paragraph thirty-four of the lease provided that: the lessee could
"request" the lessor pension trust to provide financing for
leasehold improvements, the lessor would give "reasonable
consideration" to such request, the parties would "negotiate in
good faith concerning" the request, and that should negotiations
fail, the lessee could repurchase the property at its original sales
price adjusted by a factor specified in the lease. 127 Some twenty
years after the original transaction the lessee sought financing
from a third party for improvements to the real estate. The third
party turned down the request because the lessee could not
provide a mortgage on the real estate. The lessee then sought to
repurchase the real estate. The pension trust demanded a price
of $3 million, which the lessee thought was excessive. The lessee
then twice wrote to the pension trust requesting financing for
improvements.
The lessee's letters did not mention either
paragraph thirty-four or the purchase option that would result to
the lessee should financing negotiations fail, but one of the
letters referred to "financing pursuant to the lease." 128 The
pension trust refused to provide financing, and the lessee
exercised the purchase option set forth in paragraph thirty-four,
the terms of which yielded an adjusted purchase price of $1
million. When the pension trust declined to sell, the lessee
125 Id. at 676 (quoting U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (1958)).
126 941 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 1991).
127 Id. at 591.
128

Id.
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brought suit to enforce the option. The district court granted
summary judgment to the pension trust on the ground that the
lessee did not really want financing, wanted only the opportunity
to exercise its purchase option, and breached its obligation of
good faith by omitting mention of paragraph thirty-four in its
request, thereby failing to alert the lessor to the consequences of
refusing to provide financing. The Seventh Circuit reversed the
grant of summary judgment and remanded to the district court
for a determination of what it viewed as the dispositive question
in the case-whether the lessee tried to "trick" the pension trust
into triggering the paragraph 34 option. 129 In the course of his
opinion for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner dealt with the
relationship of the implied covenant of good faith to contract
interpretation, and suggested that implying contract terms so as
to effectuate party intent would produce the same result as
imposing an implied covenant of good faith.
We could of course do without the term "good faith," and maybe
even without the doctrine. We could... speak instead of
implied conditions necessitated by the unpredictability of the
future at the time the contract was made.
But whether we say that a contract shall be deemed to contain
such implied conditions as are necessary to make sense of the
contract, or that a contract obligates the parties to cooperate in
its performance in "good faith" to the extent necessary to carry
out the purposes of the contract, comes to much the same thing.
They are different ways of formulating the overriding purpose of
contract law, which is to give the parties what they would have
stipulated for expressly if at the time of making the contract
they had had complete knowledge of the future and the costs of
negotiating and adding provisions to the contract had been
zero. 130

Despite Judge Posner's assertion that implication of contract
terms and good faith are interchangeable, the holding in Market
Street suggests otherwise. In fact, the case illustrates the way in
which the implied covenant of good faith may actually divert
inquiry from appropriate contract interpretation and implication.
In its remand, the Seventh Circuit directed the district court to
determine whether the lessee attempted to trick the pension

129
130

Id. at 596.
Id.
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trust, in which case the lessee would have acted in bad faith and
could not enforce the option. On the other hand, if the lessee did
not attempt to trick the lessor, but "acted honestly, reasonably,
without ulterior motive, in the face of circumstances as they
actually and reasonably appeared to it" there would be no bad
faith and the option should be enforced. 13 ' Of course, if bad faith
is construed as embracing conduct intended to trick, but not
embracing innocent nondisclosure, this would be the appropriate
question on which to hinge the result. But it can certainly be
argued that a different standard of conduct might have resulted
from an inquiry into what the parties, in Judge Posner's own
words, "would have stipulated for expressly if at the time of
making the contract they had had complete knowledge of the
future and the costs of negotiating and adding provisions to the
contract had been zero."'132 If, at the time of negotiating the
terms of the lease, the pension trust had envisioned a situation in
which the request for financing would not prompt the pension
trust official reviewing the request to consider paragraph thirtyfour, would the pension trust have proposed language that would
protect it only if the lessee acted with a purpose to trick the
pension trust? Or would it instead have proposed language that
would condition the purchase option on a request for financing
that directly referenced paragraph thirty-four regardless of the
lessee's motive in requesting the financing? If the pension trust
would have proposed the more protective provision, 33 would the
lessee have agreed to such a proposal? If the answers to the last
two questions are yes, then should not the pension trust win the
case, regardless of whether the lessee acted in bad faith, as such
concept was conceived by Judge Posner? Resolution of these
questions would involve considering whether the lease had a gap
that should be filled by an implied term and, if so, what that
term ought to be.
As Judge Posner suggested, the General Electric Pension
Trust is not a particularly sympathetic party to relieve of a duty
to read. Moreover, in considering whether a gap worthy of filling

131

Id. at 597.

132 Id. at 596.
133 The pension

trust likely would have proposed the more protective provision,
not just because it would be more favorable to the pension trust, but because it
would be less apt, given the absence of any requirement to inquire into the motives
of a party, to provoke litigation.
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exists it would seem relevant whether the express contract
consists of a single sentence written on the back of matchbook, or
a 100-page printed contract negotiated by legions of lawyers. On
the other hand, if an essential purpose of the purchase option
was to provide an additional incentive to the pension trust to
approve financing for the lessee, should it not be made aware of
the purchase option when the time to negotiate the financing
arrived? These are interesting and important issues that might
have been illuminated by the attention of Judge Posner, but were
not addressed.134
B. The Covenant as an Excluder of Bad Faith
Another distinguished academic who has made important
contributions to the literature on good faith is Professor Robert
Summers of Cornell University. 135 Professor Summers, an early
commentator on good faith, believes that good faith should be
conceptualized
as
an "excluder,"
having no
"general

134 Actually, Market Street was not a case requiring an implication of any term
for its decision. At least two other bases for decision can be suggested, both of which
depend on the interpretation of express language in the lease. First, paragraph 34
called for a "request" by the lessee for financing in order to trigger the purchase

option. A reasonable

definition (interpretation) of the word "request" is an

"expression of one's desire." XIII THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 679 (2d ed.

1989). If, in fact, the lessee had no desire for financing, but simply wanted to trick
the lessor into triggering the purchase option, then its request could be a fraudulent
representation of a fact (i.e., its desire for a loan). Judge Posner declined to rule on
the issue of fraud, but only with respect to whether the nondisclosure of information
readily available to both parties (i.e., the existence of paragraph 34) could be fraud.
The question of affirmative fraud was not addressed. Had the issue been addressed,
an interesting question would be raised as to whether the pension trust relied on the
misrepresentation. Although one might argue that the pension trust was indifferent
to the desires of the lessee and therefore the fraud requirement of reliance was not
met, it could also be argued that the pension trust did rely in the sense that had it
known the lessee's true desire in requesting financing it would have investigated
more carefully the consequences under the lease of turning down the request. A
second ground for decision on the facts in Market Street not requiring implication is
based on the provision of the lease explicitly requiring the parties to "negotiate in
good faith" with regard to the requested financing. If, as seems reasonable, the
lessee's initial request for the financing (or its failure to respond to the lessor's
denial of financing) is seen as part of the negotiations, then no implied covenant of
good faith would be necessary to determine the outcome of the case. The question
would then be the interpretation of "negotiate in good faith" and whether that
should require a higher standard from the lessee than simply forbearing from
tricking the lessor-a question that Judge Posner also did not address.
135 See generally Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith, supra note 4;
Summers, "Good Faith"in General Contract Law, supra note 4.
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meaning ... of its own, and [serving] to exclude a wide range of
heterogeneous forms of bad faith."136 He argues that the preU.C.C. development of good faith was consistent with his
conceptualization of the term as an excluder, 137 and believes that
the original U.C.C., because it contained positive definitions of
good faith, was seriously flawed. He attributes this flaw to the
failure of the draftsman, Karl Llewellyn (Chief Reporter for the
U.C.C.), to be "sufficiently faithful" 138 to the excluder
conceptualization. 139 According to Professor Summers, good faith
cannot be defined in the abstract because "any but the most
vacuous general definition of good faith will ...fail to cover all
the many and varied specific meanings that it is possible to
assign to the phrase in light of the many and varied forms of bad
faith recognized in the cases." 140 He believes that bad faith also
is not susceptible to statutory definition, but can only be
identified as illuminated in judicial decisions.
Courts should determine the scope of the good faith
requirement, partly because it is an unusually "circumstancebound" doctrine and excludes highly varied forms of bad faith,
many of which become identifiable only in the context of
circumstantial detail of a kind that defies comprehensive
statutory formulation. 141

Professor Summers agrees with Professor Farnsworth that
the flexibility inherent in the doctrine's application is a strength,
but Professor Summers views the scope of the doctrine as
136 Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law, supra note 4, at 201.
Professor Summers notes that Aristotle may have originated the concept of an
excluder. Summers, The GeneralDuty of Good Faith,supra note 4, at 818.
137 Summers, "Good Faith"in General Contract Law, supra note 4, at 204.
138 Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith,supra note 4, at 817.
139 See id. at 824 (explaining that judges are free to define the meaning of "good
faith" as they see fit); Summers, "Good Faith"in General Contract Law, supra note
4, at 210-12 (discussing why "with the objective half of the ... definition of good
faith lopped off, the remaining 'honesty in fact' half took on more significance").
Professor Summers says that the U.C.C. Article 1 formulation will not prevent
parties from "openly abusing the power to break off negotiations, openly taking
unfair advantage of bargaining power, openly acting capriciously or openly
undercutting another's performance." Id. at 210. Professor Summers also argues
that the excluder conceptualization is broader than the subjective/objective standard
of Article 2 since the Article 2 definition only applies in the case of a merchant and
only "insofar as there are commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade
which are reasonable." Id. at 213.
140 Summers, "Good Faith"in General Contract Law, supra note 4, at 206.
141 Id. at 215.
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broader, extending its application beyond the performance stage
to the formation stage as well. 142 Additionally, he takes issue
with Professor Farnsworth's view that the significance of good
faith lies in its role of implying contract terms. 143 Professor
Summers views good faith as an independent duty rooted in
morality.1 4 4 He identifies four broad categories of bad faith. The
first is bad faith in contract negotiation and formation, 145 which
is not recognized by either Restatement Second or the U.C.C.
good faith provisions.
The other three, bad faith in
performance, 46 bad faith in raising and resolving contract
disputes, 47 and bad faith in taking remedial action, 48 generally
coincide with Restatement Second and the U.C.C. requirements of
good faith in performance and enforcement. Professor Summers
then further identifies several subcategories of each of his four
categories of bad faith. Subcategories of bad faith in performance
include evasion of the spirit of the deal, lack of diligence and
slacking off, willful rendering of only substantial performance,
abuse of the power to specify terms, abuse of the power to
determine compliance, and interference with or failure to
cooperate in the other party's performance. Bad faith in raising
and resolving contract disputes may consist of conjuring up a
dispute,
adopting overreaching or "weaseling" contract
interpretations, and taking advantage to obtain a contract
modification or dispute settlement. Bad faith remedial actions
include abuse of the right to adequate assurances, wrongful
refusal to accept performance from the other party, willful failure
to mitigate damages, and abuse of the power to terminate. 49
Professor Summers' excluder analysis clearly influenced the
approach of Restatement Second to the implied covenant of good
faith. 150 Although the language of Restatement Second section
142
143

Id. at 220-32.
Id. at 233.

144 See id. at 198 (recognizing that where "a party is legally as well as morally
obligated to act in good faith, he will be significantly less likely to break faith"); see
also id. at 195 ("[T]here is a growing interest in devising legal standards of
contractual morality.").
145
146
147
148

149

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

220-32.
232-43.
243-48.
248-52.
232-52.

150 See generally Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith, supra note 4, at
810-24 (highlighting the substantial influence that Summers' 1968 article had on
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205 is not materially different from its counterpart in the
U.C.C.,151 reflecting Professor Summers' view, Restatement
Second does not attempt any definition of good faith (or bad faith
for that matter). Instead, in comments, Restatement Second
refers to types of conduct that Professor Summers identifies as
152
bad faith in performance and enforcement.
Professor Summers' formulation is subject to three
objections. The first derives from his assertion that "good faith"
cannot be defined because it has no substantive content-it
functions instead to exclude bad faith. Yet he also tells us that
bad faith cannot (and should not) be defined, but should be
recognized as it arises in specific instances. Unquestioningly,
there is room for imprecision in the law (think "I know it when I
see it"). But something seems amiss about a concept that has no
meaning on its own, yet serves as the negative of another concept
that also cannot be defined. If bad faith can be identified when it
is revealed in specific circumstances, why is it that good faith
cannot be similarly recognized?
A second objection to the excluder analysis is its assumption
that good faith must be present when bad faith is not found.
This assumption is evident in the examples Professor Summers
offers to illustrate "excluders"-"voluntary" as the excluder of
"involuntary" and "real" as the excluder of "not real."153 These
excluders are terms that, by definition, completely negate each
other (all voluntary acts are not involuntary and vice versa). On
the other hand, the term "good faith" is not, at least by definition,
a complete negation of "bad faith," and Professor Summers'
application of the excluder analysis does not recognize the
possibility that the faith of an action can be normatively
neutral-neither good nor bad. Certainly, a deed that is not a
good deed is not necessarily a bad deed. On a beautiful summer
the "recognition

and conceptualization

of good faith in section 205" of the

Restatement Second). In this connection, it is worth noting that of the two Reporters
for the Restatement Second, Professor Robert Braucher and Professor E. Allan
Farnsworth, it was Professor Braucher who was responsible for section 205.
Id. at 810. Professor Braucher was Reporter until 1971, Professor Farnsworth was
Reporter from then on. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS v (1979).
151 Compare U.C.C. § 1-304 (2005) (stating that every contract within the U.C.C.
"imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement"), with

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (imposing on each party to a contract

"a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement").

§ 205

152

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

153

Summers, "Good Faith"in General Contract Law, supra note 4, at 201-02.

cmts. a, d.
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morning I may either play golf or volunteer at the local halfway
house for homicidal maniacs. Volunteering at the halfway house
would be a good deed, but am I doing a bad deed by playing golf
instead? I hope not.
The distinction suggested is a matter of some semantic
consequence (at least) because both the U.C.C. and Restatement
Second formulate the duty of good faith as a positive rather than
a negative duty. Thus, a performance or enforcement that is not
in bad faith could still violate Restatement Second section 205 if
it is also not in good faith. Nor is this objection trivial; the
failure of the excluder analysis to attend to this problem may
have real consequences. For example, Professor Summers could
rightly count Market Street Associates v. Frey as a case that
adopts his approach.15 4 Judge Posner identified the dispositive
issue in the case as whether the lessee intended to trick the
lessor into triggering the purchase option. In that case, his focus
was on the negative or bad faith question raised by the lessee's
conduct. Yet one may wonder whether the lessee, acting in good
faith, ought to have called attention to paragraph thirty-four
even if it was not trying to trick the lessor. Requiring the lessee
to cite lease paragraph thirty-four in any financing request would
be a plausible gap-filler if a principal purpose of paragraph
thirty-four was to provide an incentive to the lessor to make a
loan so as not to trigger the right of repurchase. If the lessor
overlooked the right of repurchase and refused the request on
ordinary underwriting considerations, an important object of
such right's inclusion in the lease would be negated. Professor
Summers could, of course, point to his good faith articles (along
with other authority) supporting the proposition that bad faith
conduct is broader than dishonesty, 155 and Judge Posner, though
citing Professor Summers' 1968 article in Market Street, may
simply have failed to be guided by it. Nevertheless, it seems a
stretch to say that the lessee (assuming it did not suspect the
lessor's misapprehension) acted in bad faith; on the other hand it
seems not nearly as great a strain to say that "good faith" should

154 See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
155

See, e.g., BURTON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 123 (doubting that any

court would define "good faith" as "honesty in fact alone"); Summers, "Good Faith"in
General Contract Law, supra note 4, at 204-06 (claiming that because forms of bad
faith are so broad, it is unlikely for judges to be able to use one definition for the
term extensively).
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require calling attention to paragraph thirty-four if there is a
recognized possibility of the lessor's misapprehension.
A third objection to Professor Summers' approach has to do
with how he views the role of the implied covenant of good faith.
This Article makes the argument that the implied covenant of
good faith has operated as a kind of "safety valve," 156 useful in
curing unreasonable and unjust results the formalists might
otherwise reach because of the plain meaning and parol evidence
rules. Given the more enlightened attitudes to interpretation
and gap-filling recognized today, the good faith covenant is no
longer needed. Professor Summer takes just the opposite view.
[I]n addition to the more familiar sources of standards of
performance-for example, the contract language itself, case
law on how contract gaps are to be filled, and custom and
usage-judges turn to specific concepts of good faith in deciding
whether a party has or has not performed his agreement.
Admittedly, judges frequently introduce these concepts as
implied terms in contracts, and not as duties of good faith. But
it is almost always better to recognize something for what it is
rather than to fictionalize it. And surely, how a doctrine is
conceptualized can affect the outcome of cases. For example, it
seems likely that a judge who thinks in terms of implied
provisions will be less willing to enforce duties of good faith
than the judge who thinks explicitly in terms of such duties; one
who views himself as "implying terms" is more likely to think he
is remaking a contract to some extent-something which judges
are reluctant to do.157
What Professor Summers says-"it is almost always better to
recognize something for what it is rather than to fictionalize
it... [a]nd surely, how a doctrine is conceptualized can affect the
outcome of cases" 15 8-is true. But in a case where the meaning of
a contract is disputed, it is preferable to approach the dispute as
a matter of contract interpretation and gap-filling, rather than
an occasion for enforcing a duty of good faith. Of the fourteen
examples of bad faith in performance and enforcement identified
156 Professor Summers uses the term "safety valve" in a more general sense.
"[The requirement of good faith often functions as a kind of 'safety valve' which may
be turned to fill gaps and qualify or limit rights and duties arising under contracts
or rules of law." Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law, supra note 4, at
215-16.
157 Id. at 233.
158 Id.
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by Professor Summers, 159 three would appear not to involve
questions of contract meaning and therefore would not be
resolvable based on interpretation and gap-filling. 160 The other
examples of bad faith offered by Professor Summers are all
susceptible to the interpretation and gap-filling techniques
described in Restatement Second and the U.C.C.
A clear
illustration of this point is Professor Summers' identification of
evading the spirit of the deal as bad faith. Whether the spirit of
the deal has been evaded cannot be answered until the "deal" and
its "spirit" have been identified. This must be done through
interpretation and gap-filling. After that it should be evident
whether a party has breached its obligations under the contract.
As examples of evasions of the spirit of the deal, Professor
Summers offers cases in which a buyer who is a party to a
requirements contract either attempts to avoid ordering what it
really needs (say, in the case of a falling market), or attempts to
expand its requirements beyond its normal business needs (say,
in the case of a rising market). Approaching these cases as
matters of interpretation would involve inquiring into the
negotiations and other contextual factors of the transaction (e.g.,
historical requirements of buyer, course of dealing), and filling
any gaps with court-determined fair and reasonable terms. At
best, deciding these cases on whether the spirit of the deal has
been evaded is a less accurate description of what the court
should be doing-identifying the contract and enforcing it. At
worst, such a method of deciding these cases is unprincipled and
may lead to erroneous results in determining rights under the
contract. 161
Another, but perhaps less obvious, illustration that Professor
Summers' bad faith cases should be decided as matters of
interpretation and gap-filling, appears in his category of bad

159 See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
160 The three are willful rendering of only substantial performance, willful
failure to mitigate damages, and taking advantage to obtain a contract modification
or dispute settlement. The first and second are rules of law limiting the right to
damages, and the third is a policing mechanism to prevent duress-type behavior by a

party seeking to obtain an advantage in contract modification or settlement. See
Summers, "Good Faith"in General ContractLaw, supra note 4, at 237, 246, 250.
161 Mkt. St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991), discussed in the text
accompanying notes 126-34, may be an example of a court reaching a result
inconsistent with modern principles of interpretation and gap-filling because of its
focus on the good faith doctrine.
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faith in abuse of power to terminate. Professor Summers uses
cases involving contracts that permit franchise terminations "at
will" as examples.' 62 Parties asserting bad faith in these
situations have occasionally prevailed, but most often courts
163
seem to apply a plain meaning rule to a right to terminate.
However, even the staunch textualist Justice Scalia (then Circuit
Judge Scalia) observed that a contract term providing a power to
terminate "within [a party's] sole discretion" may not be the
equivalent of a term providing a power to terminate "for any
164
reason whatsoever, no matter how arbitrary or unreasonable."'
Based on this nonequivalency,
a legitimate issue of
interpretation and gap-filling is raised. The inquiry should focus
on the question of whether the parties shared an interpretation
that would or would not limit the power to terminate, and if they
did not share such an interpretation, whether only one of the
parties knew or had reason to know of the other's interpretation.
Arguably, without the distraction of a claimed breach of good
faith a court might attend more closely to these questions.
Professor Summers' approach to the role of the duty of good
faith is largely determined by his belief that the duty is rooted in
morality rather than in individual autonomy, and therefore may
be used to support results contrary to the party intentions.
Professor Robert A. Hillman, of Cornell Law School, an admirer
of Professor Summers' approach to good faith, 65 discusses such a
situation based on the facts of Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell.166 In
Tymshare, Justice Scalia, then a D.C. Circuit judge, held that
there is an implied duty to act in good faith when retroactively
changing the sales quota determining the amount of commission
earned by a salesman. Covell, a salesman for Tymshare, was
paid salary and commission based on sales credited to Covell in
excess of a quota set by Tymshare. Tymshare won a contract
from the United States Postal Service, allegedly based on Covell's
efforts. Substantial revenues were expected from the contract,
and Tymshare set Covell's sales quota so that he would earn
162

Summers, "Good Faith"in General Contract Law, supra note 4, at 251-52.

163 See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 4, at 141-46; Van Alstine, supra note

4, at 1258-65 (reviewing cases arising in varying contexts rejecting good faith claims
in favor of literal enforcement of contract terms).
164 Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For a
discussion of Tymshare, see infra text accompanying notes 166-77.
162 See ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW 143-46 (1998).
166

727 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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$31,000 in commission if the Postal Service contract produced the
expected revenues. 167 When the Postal Service revenues initially
proved to be lower than projected, Tymshare reduced Covell's
quota so that he would still receive the $31,000 commission.
Postal Service revenues subsequently picked up, eventually
exceeding even the original projection. Shortly after adjusting
Covell's quotas back to the original level, Tymshare fired him.
The question presented to the court was whether Tymshare had
acted in bad faith in increasing the quotas. The court held that
although the employment contract permitted retroactive quota
increases within the "sole discretion" of the employer, Tymshare
68
was not entitled to "reduce the quota for any reason whatever."1
Justice Scalia interpreted the sole discretion language of the
contract as giving Tymshare only "discretion to determine the
existence or nonexistence of the various factors that would
reasonably justify alteration of the sales quota,"169 factors
primarily based on the performance of Covell. This conclusion
was not drawn using a good faith analysis, but was grounded in
Justice Scalia's belief that the parties did not intend Tymshare's
discretion to be absolute.
Rather, Tymshare's discretion
depended on whether the reasons for the quota increase were
consistent with the factors that would justify it. In effect, Justice
Scalia saw a gap and filled it as he believed the parties would
have. Justice Scalia did not, apparently, discern any significant
difference between adjudicating a case based on an independent
duty of good faith or using good faith to imply terms into a
contract, since he explicitly approved of both Professor Summers'
excluder analysis as well as Professor Farnsworth's view that the
significance of the good faith doctrine is to imply terms into
contracts. 170 In comparing implication of terms into contracts
based on parties' expectations with the duty of good faith, Justice
Scalia said:
[T]he authorities that invoke, with increasing frequency, an allpurpose doctrine of "good faith" are usually if not invariably
performing the same function executed (with more elegance and
precision) by Judge Cardozo... when he found that an
agreement which did not recite a particular duty was
167

Id. at 1149.
at 1154.
Id.

168 Id.
169

170 Id. at 1152.
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imperfectly

expressed.. . ." The new formulation may have more appeal to

modern taste since it purports to rely directly upon
considerations of morality and public policy, rather than
achieving those objectives obliquely, by honoring the reasonable
expectations created by the autonomous expressions of the
contracting parties. But
it seems to us that the result is, or
17 1
should be, the same.
Justice Scalia's view of the relationship of good faith to contract
interpretation and gap-filling is thus similar to that expressed by
Judge Posner in Market Street Associates.
In discussing Tymshare, Professor Hillman reaches a
conclusion that Justice Scalia probably would not share.
Professor Hillman's analysis proceeds by suggesting some
hypothetical variations on the Tymshare facts.
First, he
supposes that the agreement "had expressly permitted
management to change the sales quotas at any time 'for the sole
purpose of reducing or eliminating the employee's earned
commissions' "172 rather than providing that quotas could be
increased within the sole discretion of the employer. Next, he
hypothesizes that Covell agreed to the hypothetical term with
full understanding of its implications, and then sued Tymshare
based on breach of good faith when it increased his quotas solely
173
for the purpose of reducing or eliminating commissions.
Finally, Professor Hillman suggests that the contract is not
unconscionable, so that Covell's only chance of prevailing would
be on the ground of lack of good faith. Conceding that the change
in the quota would be within the reasonable expectations of
Covell, Professor Hillman nevertheless concludes that "[m]any
courts faced with such harsh facts would probably find bad
1 74
faith."
In Tymshare, Justice Scalia stated that the term in the
contract was not the same as one that permitted the employer to
change quotas "for any reason whatsoever, no matter how

171 Id. at 1152-53 (quoting Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 68, 91,
118 N.E. 214, 214 (1917) (quoting McCall Co. v. Wright, 133 A.D. 62, 68, 117 N.Y.S.
775, 779 (1st Dep't 1909), aff'd, 198 N.Y. 143, 91 N.E. 516 (1910))).
172 HILLMAN, supra note 165, at 150.
173 Id. at 150-51.
174 Id. at 151. For an argument that there might be valid reasons for Covell to
agree to the hypothetical term, see supra note 117.
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arbitrary or unreasonable." 175 Although Professor Hillman's
hypothetical language is not as strong as the hypothetical
language of Justice Scalia, it seems likely that the Hillman
language was intended to convey the same meaning as the Scalia
language. Had the alternative language (either version) been
used, Justice Scalia would have held that the increase in quota
was not in bad faith. In his opinion he carefully separates good
faith from other contract rules that are applicable without regard
to party intent.
Of course it may be that even when the contract does not
contain any implicit restriction upon a contractual power, the
law itself will impose one-just as it will eliminate certain
contractual powers in their entirety as unlawful, for example, a
penalty clause. This pertains, however, not to good faith in
performance but to the legality of the performance that has
been agreed to. The nonbreaching party who applies by its
explicit terms a self-help provision that amounts to a
penalty... is performing the contract in the utmost good faith,
but under a provision that is unlawful. It is not conducive to
sound analysis to confuse the two concepts, as sometimes
occurs, particularly where illegality on the basis of
176
unconscionability is at issue.
Although one can understand why Professor Hillman
reaches the conclusion that he does-it supports Professor
Summers' notion that bad faith is an independent duty not
controlled by standard notions of interpretation and gap-fillinghis conclusion is defensible only if two unstated propositions are
correct.
The first proposition is that the doctrine of
unconscionability, as presently formulated, is inadequate to
regulate unfair bargains not voidable by fraud, duress, mistake,
etc. This proposition may or may not be true. The second
proposition is that if the unconscionability doctrine is inadequate
to regulate unfair bargains, the good faith doctrine should be
used to make up for the inadequacies of the unconscionability
doctrine. This second proposition is hard to defend. The Hillman
hypothetical amounts to no more or less than invalidating a fully
consensual agreement based on its unfairness-an action
precisely within the domain of the unconscionability doctrine. If
the unconscionability doctrine is deficient, the appropriate
175
176

Tymshare, 727 F.2d at 1154.
Id. at 1152 n.5 (citation omitted).
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remedy is to cure its deficiencies, not to mask them by
announcing a parallel doctrine. This is especially true when the
"plain meaning" of the parallel doctrine's name (i.e., good faith in
performance and enforcement) so poorly describes the use to
which it is sought to be put (i.e., unfair in formation). How can a
party be said to be performing or enforcing in bad faith when it
does no more or less than what was expressly agreed to and
177
understood by the parties?
The attempt to accommodate Professor Summers' moralitybased good faith analysis with the view that the object of the
good faith covenant is to effectuate party expectations, and the
confusion this attempt can engender, can be seen in a comment
to Restatement Second section 205: "Good faith performance or
enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations
of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct
characterized as involving 'bad faith' because they violate
' 178
community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness."
Applying the first clause of the comment to Professor
Hillman's hypothetical based on the Tymshare facts would seem
to require upholding the employer's right, based on the express
agreement reflecting a common purpose and the expectations of
the parties that a change in quotas for the sole purpose of
reducing or eliminating commissions would be acceptable. On
the other hand, the second clause of the comment, although
apparently intended to be consistent with the first clause, would
support, in Professor Hillman's view, invalidating the employer's

177

A response to this criticism could be based on the fact that Professor

Summers' excluder analysis suggests that bad faith in contract negotiation or
formation, as well as in contract performance, may provoke judicial disapproval. See
Summers, "Good Faith"in General Contract Law, supra note 4, at 220-32. Of the
five types of bad faith in negotiation or formation identified by Professor Summers
in his 1968 article, one, taking advantage of another in driving a hard bargain,
would seem to cover Professor Hillman's hypothetical. Nevertheless, the excluder
analysis has failed to gain traction in contract formation situations; instead these
situations have been evaluated under other contract formation rules. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. c (1979). Moreover, even if the
good faith doctrine is considered applicable to negotiation and formation, as well as
performance, if Tymshare and Covell voluntarily agreed to the quota provision as
posited by Professor Hillman, it is difficult to see how Tymshare could be said to
have negotiated in bad faith.
178

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a.
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right to change quotas, regardless of the agreement, since such
action violated standards of fairness.
C. The Covenant and RecapturingForegone Opportunities
Professor Steven Burton of the University of Iowa is yet
another of the distinguished scholars who have been influential
writers about good faith. 179
Professor Burton agrees with
Professor Farnsworth that the implied covenant of good faith
performance is used to carry out the intention of the parties or to
protect their reasonable expectations by interpreting agreements
and implying terms. 8 0 Unlike Professor Summers, he does not
believe that the doctrine has been used (except in aberrational
cases) 8 to effectuate results inconsistent with party intent for
purposes of achieving results based on "fairness, policy, or
morality;"'1 2 nor does he think it should be so used. 8 3 Professor
Burton's position on good faith is distinguishable from that of
Professor Farnsworth mainly by the fact that he believes that the
good faith doctrine would be superfluous if it did no more than
justify implication of terms so as to effectuate party intent. 8 4 In
such a case there would be no meaningful difference between the
two statements: "Contracts ought to be performed according to
their terms in good faith," and "Contracts ought to be performed
according to their terms."'8 5 In discussing the U.C.C. good faith
requirement, he writes:
When employed as a principle underlying standards of
interpretation and rules of performance, good faith as pacta
sunt servanda would add little to the analysis of a particular
problem of contract performance. It would mean what the
relevant contract terms, standard of interpretation, and rules of
179 See generally BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 4; Burton, Breach of
Contract, supra note 4; Burton, Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2, supra note 4; Burton,
Good Faith Performance, supra note 4; Burton, More on Good Faith Performance,
supra note 4.
180 Burton, More on Good FaithPerformance,supra note 4, at 499.
181 See Burton, Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2, supranote 4, at 1535.
182 Id. at 1534; Burton, Good FaithPerformance,supra note 4, at 3.
183 See Burton, Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2, supra note 4, at 1535-36, 155257.
184 Professor Farnsworth had written that "the chief utility of the concept of
good faith performance has always been as a rationale in a process which is not
intrusted to the trier of the facts-that of implying contract terms." Farnsworth,
Good FaithPerformance, supra note 4, at 672.
185 See Burton, Good Faith Performance,supra note 4, at 4-5.
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performance provide.
To say that good faith underlies
standards of interpretation and rules of performance would be
to say that the content of a contract is determined with
reference to the agreement of the parties, including adherence
to courses of dealing and usages of the trade not negated by
express terms, and to the applicable rules of law, construed in
light of the underlying purposes and policies of the U.C.C.
Awareness of the underlying good faith principle would not
affect the determination of the relevant facts in a dispute, or
86
their import. 1
He finds meaning in the good faith doctrine only insofar as it
directs attention to facts relevant to the costs undertaken in
contract formation (as opposed to facts relevant to the expected
benefits of the contract). 18 7 As Professor Burton sees it, these
costs can be affected when a party exercises discretion in contract
performance. Such discretion can arise because the contract
explicitly grants discretion to one party or because the express
contract terms have gaps or ambiguities that, in effect, confer
discretion on a party.18 8 The core of his analysis is that a party in
these circumstances who exercises discretion so as to recapture
opportunities forgone in the contract is performing in bad faith;
on the other hand a party who exercises discretion to capture
opportunities preserved (or not forgone) in the contract is acting
in good faith.1 8 9 Initially, Professor Burton believed that the
subjective purpose (i.e., actual motive) of the party exercising
discretion would determine whether the disputed action was an
attempt to recapture forgone opportunities. Subsequently, he
changed his view and now supports judging actions on objective
grounds (i.e., whether an action was justified on any reasonably
The dependent party's reasonable
expectable ground). 190
expectations at the time of contract formation with respect to
forgone opportunities of the discretion-exercising party, and the
reasons for the discretion-exercising party's actions at the time
for performance, determine whether a recaptured opportunity is
characterized as preserved or forgone by the contract and thus
whether the good faith requirement was observed or breached.1 91
Id. (footnote omitted).
See id. at 5.
188 See Burton, More on Good FaithPerformance,supra note 4, at 501.
189 See Burton, Good FaithPerformance, supra note 4, at 5-6.
190 See Burton, Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2, supra note 4, at 1561-62.
191Burton, Good Faith Performance,supra note 4, at 6. Professor Burton deals
186
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Professor Burton believes that refining the concept of good faith
encourages plaintiffs to sue "only when they stand a reasonable
192
chance of succeeding and of succeeding for good reasons."
It is hard to argue with Professor Burton's view that the
good faith doctrine is superfluous if it serves only as a
justification for requiring contract performance that is within the
justifiable expectations of the parties. But it is also hard to
argue that his forgone opportunity analysis is necessary, or even
helpful, in analyzing whether a party has exercised discretion in
a manner permitted by the contract. Clearly, parties who enter
into contracts forgo their opportunities to act in specified and
unspecified ways. The very nature of a bilateral contract is to
create obligations in exchange for rights. Thus, if I promise to
cut my neighbor's lawn in exchange for her promise to pay me
$10, I have forgone the opportunities that might have been
available to me by not cutting her lawn.
But forgone
opportunities will be revealed in the same way reasonably
expected benefits will be revealed-by determining the
agreement of the parties based on principles of interpretation
and gap-filling. Until the agreement is so determined it is not
possible to identify opportunities that were forgone by entering
the contract. After the agreement is so determined the forgone
opportunities will be known but will be of no consequence in
determining the rights and obligations of the parties-these have
already been determined by the process of interpretation and
gap-filling.
An examination of Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v.
Tailored Woman, Inc., 193 one of a series of percentage rent cases
that Professor Burton has referred to in three of his writings, 194
illustrates this point. In Tailored Woman, the defendant lessee,
which operated a women's clothing department store, contracted
in 1939 to lease the first three floors of an eight-story Manhattan
with good faith contract enforcement as a separate but related issue to good faith
performance. He sees good faith enforcement as invoking remedial rights when
necessary to protect a party's interest in receiving performance from the other party.
See generally BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 4, at 163-95.
192 Burton, Good Faithin Articles 1 and 2, supra note 4, at 1535.
193

309 N.Y. 248, 128 N.E.2d 401 (1955), aff'g 283 A.D. 173, 126 N.Y.S.2d 573

(1st Dep't 1953).

194 BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 4, at 55-57; Burton, Breach of Contract,
supra note 4, at 384-85; Burton, More on Good Faith Performance,supra note 4, at
502-03.
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building located at the corner of Fifth Avenue and West FiftySeventh Street. Included as rent was four percent of all sales
made "on, in, and from" the leased premises. 195 The lease
described the premises as having an address of 742 Fifth Avenue.
The lessee was given exclusive use of a Fifth Avenue entrance, a
Fifty-Seventh Street entrance, and two passenger elevators that
were capped at the third floor. The 1939 lease further provided
that the lessee's business would "be conducted and maintained in
a manner substantially similar to" the business it had conducted
at its prior location, where it operated a fur department. 196
Initially, the lessee conducted a substantial fur business in
the leased premises. Subsequently, in 1945, the lessee acquired
the custom-made dress business of a fifth-floor tenant in the
same building. After acquiring this business, the lessee entered
into a new lease of the fifth-floor premises of the acquired
business with the original lessor. The new lease provided for a
flat rental payment only. The 1945 lease described the leased
premises as having an address of 1 West 57th Street. It provided
that the fifth-floor space was to be used for the sale of all types of
women's clothing and accessories, that the 1945 lease would have
no effect on the 1939 lease, that the lessee could not make any
alteration in the leased premises without the lessor's consent,
and that the landlord would maintain the elevators that serviced
the fifth floor. 197
Shortly after taking possession of the fifth-floor premises,
the lessee altered the two elevators that serviced the first three
floors so that they could carry passengers to and from its fifthfloor premises. Initially, the lessee continued the custom-made
dress business it had acquired, but when that business was not
successful, the lessee integrated the fifth floor into its
department store and moved its fur department to that floor. 198
195 See Tailored Woman, 309 N.Y. at 252, 128 N.E.2d at 402.

196 Id. at 252, 128 N.E.2d at 402.
197 Id. at 255, 128 N.E.2d at 405 (Burke, J., dissenting).
198The Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the Appellate Division, but the
majority opinions of the two courts differed on the question of when the lessee
altered the elevators and integrated the fifth floor into the department store. The
Court of Appeals stated that the elevator alteration occurred, and the first three
floors were integrated with the fifth floor, after the custom-made dress business was
discontinued. Id. at 253, 128 N.E.2d at 402-03 (majority opinion). On the other
hand, the Appellate Division stated that the elevators were altered, and the
operations integrated, by the lessee immediately after it took possession of the fifth
floor, the custom-made dress business being discontinued at some later time. 283
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The lessor sued for percentage rent on fur sales made on the fifth
floor, arguing, first, that the fur sales were made "on, in, or from"
the 1939 premises and, second, that the lessee breached express
and implied covenants in the lease, including the implied
covenant of good faith.199
The New York Court of Appeals acknowledged that the
lessor, when it entered into the 1945 lease, "did not contemplate"
that the lessee would remove business from the first three floors
to the fifth floor. 200 Nevertheless, the court held that since
neither the 1939 nor 1945 leases contained provisions that
precluded moving the fur department, percentage rent was not
due on fur sales that originated on the fifth floor. The lessor's
lack of "foresight" in failing to appropriately restrict the 1945
lease could not, in the view of the court, "create rights or
20 1
obligations" apart from the written terms of the leases.
Referring to the implied covenant of good faith, the court said:
"In deciding this case as we do, we are not moving away from the
good old rule that there is in every contract an implied covenant
of fair dealing. Defendant, as we see it, was merely exercising its
rights ."202
Professor Burton's analysis of Tailored Woman is that the
court concluded that the lessee did not act in bad faith because
exercising its discretion to shift business from one floor to
20 3
another was "an expectable [or 'normal'] business practice"
based on "the justified expectations of the parties arising from
their agreement," 204 and accordingly the lessee had not
attempted to recapture any forgone opportunities. But whether
forgone opportunities were recaptured can be determined only by
interpreting the contract. The forgone opportunities assessment
is no more or less than a conclusion that follows a judgment that
the contract has been breached or not been breached. It provides
no assistance in determining whether the contract has been
breached; and since, in Professor Burton's view, a bad faith
breach is like any other breach in that it results in harm to the
A.D. at 176, 126 N.Y.S. 2d at 575, aff'd, 309 N.Y. 252, 128 N.E.2d 401 (1955).
199309 N.Y. at 255, 128 N.E.2d at 404.
200 Id.
at 253, 128 N.E.2d at 403.
201 Id. at 253, 128 N.E.2d at 403.
202 Id. at 254, 128 N.E.2d at 403 (citations omitted).
203 BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 4, at 56; Burton, Breach of Contract,supra
note 4, at 386 n.79.
204 BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 4, at 57.
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expectation interest of a party, it is difficult to see the "distinctive
mission"20 5 for the good faith performance doctrine that saves it
20 6
from being "redundant to other contract obligations."
In their book, Professors Burton and Anderson claim that
"[m]ost cases invoking the obligation to perform in good faith can
be synthesized using the following principle: a party performs in
bad faith by using discretion in performance for reasons outside
the justified expectations of the parties arising from their
agreement." 207 As they apply this analysis to Tailored Woman,
Professors Burton and Anderson observe that the court
concluded, based on the justified expectations of the parties, that
the exercise of discretion in moving the fur department was an
expectable business practice. 20 8 But such an observation does not
address the real question of the case-how did the court
determine what the justified expectations of the parties were?
Once such a determination is made, the forgone opportunities
will inevitably be revealed. It is apparent from reading Tailored
Woman that the New York Court of Appeals, although not
expressly relying on the plain meaning rule, reached its
conclusion on the basis that the lease provisions, by their terms,
20 9
did not preclude moving the fur department to the fifth floor.
Although the court recited facts relating to the context of the
transaction, such as the history of the fur department's
operation, the lessee's alteration of the elevators, and the lessor's
not contemplating that the 1945 lease would enable the lessee to
move the fur department, these facts were treated as essentially
irrelevant in the face of a general provision in the 1945 lease
allowing sales of women's clothing without restrictions. Another

205 Id. at 41.
206

207
208
209

Id.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 56.
The court said:

There is nothing in the main lease to forbid the moving of the fur

department and when plaintiff made [the 1945] lease, it again failed to
include any restrictions as to the particular kinds of merchandise to be sold
in one or the other part of the building ....True, the [1945] lease said that
it would "not have any effect" on the earlier lease but the effect of the two
leases, read together and enforcing both, was that defendant had the right
to sell all kinds of women's apparel, etc., in any part of [the leased
premises], so long as not other use was made of the premises. As we see it,
defendant merely exercised that right when it moved the fur department.
309 N.Y. at 253-54, 128 N.E.2d at 403.
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court, adopting principles of interpretation embraced by the
Restatement Second, would proceed in a wholly different manner,
however. After weighing the contextual factors and applying
standards of interpretation based on knowledge or reason to
know of the lessor and the lessee, and judging whether a gap
existed given the purpose of the leases, such a court might
conclude that the 1945 lease ought to be interpreted to limit fifthfloor sales to types of merchandise not sold on the first three
floors at the time of the 1945 lease. Or, on the other hand, such a
court might conclude that neither party had reason to know of
the understanding of the other and that no gaps in need of filling
existed, so that the lessee would be allowed to move the fur
department to the fifth floor. Whichever way such a court
decided the case, it is difficult to see how a consideration of either
good faith or forgone opportunities would be either necessary or
helpful.

D. The Nondisclaimable,Nonbreachable, "Nonexcluderable"
Implied Covenant of Good Faith
The U.C.C., originally promulgated in 1951 under the joint
sponsorship of the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, was the
most significant development in the history of the implied
covenant of good faith. Until then, as Professor Farnsworth
observed, the covenant had been recognized in only a handful of
jurisdictions. 210 Ultimately, every state adopted all of the articles
of the U.C.C., except for Louisiana, which did not adopt Article 2.
The original U.C.C. contained several provisions and comments
referring to good faith in specific applications, as well as a
general provision in Article 1 requiring good faith in the
performance and enforcement of all contracts. 2 11 Article 1
defined good faith as honesty in fact, but a special definition for
purposes of Article 2 defined good faith in the case of merchants
as honesty in fact and observance of reasonable commercial
standards.
The Article 1 limitation of good faith to honesty in fact was
probably the most controversial aspect of the original U.C.C.'s
good faith provisions. The limitation was roundly criticized by
210
211

Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance,supra note 4, at 671.
See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 4, at 115.
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commentators, and revised Article 1, adopted in 2001, expanded
the general definition of good faith to require objective good faith
(i.e., observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing) as well as subjective good faith. In other words, the
general Article 1 definition of good faith now follows the original
special definition adopted for purposes of Article 2, except that
the requirement of objective good faith is no longer limited to
merchants.
The debate over the absence of a general objective standard
of good faith overshadowed three other questions raised by the
good faith provisions of the U.C.C. These other three questions,
which are more relevant to the hypothesis of this Article, will be
explored here. The first was raised by Professor Summers, who
believes that the concept of good faith has no meaning other than
as an excluder of bad faith, which itself should not be defined.
His seminal article in Virginia Law Review strongly criticized the
original U.C.C. in treating good faith as an affirmative duty
capable of definition. 2 12 As was discussed above, Professor
Summers' view clearly influenced the content of Restatement
Second.2 13 Given that the American Law Institute was one of the
two joint sponsors of the U.C.C. as well as the promulgator of
Restatement Second, it is odd that the 2001 revision of U.C.C.
Article 1 retains the good faith covenant as an affirmative
concept, not an excluder, and, perhaps more significantly, retains
virtually the same definition of good faith as appeared in Article
2 of the original version. 214 Moreover, the official comment to the
revised Article 1, although relatively lengthy, gives no hint of the
excluder analysis contained in the comments to Restatement
Second section 205 and no legislative history of the Article 1
revision seems to address the question. One is left to wonder at
the utility of a concept so unsettled that even the question of
Summers, "Good Faith"in General ContractLaw, supra note 4, at 215.
See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
214 Professor
Summers' most severe criticisms of the U.C.C. good faith
provisions were aimed at the subjective definition of good faith in Article 1. See
Summers, "Good Faith"in General Contract Law, supra note 4, at 207-16. To the
extent that the revised Article 1 now incorporates both a subjective and an objective
requirement of good faith, the revision can be said to have responded positively to
Professor Summers' view. Nevertheless, his influence here is diluted by virtue of the
fact that the other two leading commentators on the U.C.C. good faith provisions
had also condemned Article l's limitation of good faith to honesty in fact. See
Burton, Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2, supra note 4, at 1560-63; Farnsworth, Good
Faith Performance,supra note 4, at 666, 673-74.
212

213
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whether it is capable of definition arouses contradictory answers
from the most prominent nongovernmental legal authority in the
land.
The second question raised by the U.C.C. good faith
provisions came into focus when the Permanent Editorial Board
for the Uniform Commercial Code adopted PEB Commentary
No. 10 in 1994,215 which concluded that a failure to perform or
enforce a contract in good faith is not actionable in the absence of
other grounds for determining that the contract has been
breached. The commentary and its accompanying amendment of
the official comment to the good faith obligation provision of the
U.C.C. represented the rejection of another aspect of Professor
Summers' excluder analysis, which advocated for an independent
duty of good faith, not tied to agreement of the parties, but rooted
in notions of morality and fairness. 2 16 The commentary, on the
other hand, adopted the view that the sole purpose of the good
faith obligation is to protect the reasonable expectations of the
parties. The commentary relates the "conceptual content" of the
good faith obligation to the term "agreement" as it is broadly
used in the U.C.C. to refer to the bargain of the parties as
determined from the express agreement as well as from
contextual factors such as trade usage, course of dealing, and
course of performance. The commentary rejects the view that a
party can act, or fail to act, in good faith except in relation to the
agreement, and added the following language to the official
comment to U.C.C. section 1-203:
This section does not support an independent cause of action for
failure to perform or enforce in good faith. Rather, this section
means that a failure to perform or enforce, in good faith, a
215 The Permanent Editorial Board ("PEB") for the Uniform Commercial Code is
a body under the joint control of the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The PEB, from time to time,
issues commentary on the U.C.C. which "seek to further the underlying policies of
the UCC by affording guidance in interpreting and resolving issues raised by the
UCC and/or the Official Comments." U.C.C. app. I, at 1310 cmt. 10 (2005). The
members of the PEB at the time of the issuance of Commentary No. 10 were:
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. (Chair), Boris Auerbach, Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Gerald L.
Bepko, Amelia H. Boss, Lawrence J. Bugge, William M. Burke, Ronald DeKoven,
Frederick H. Miller, Donald J. Rapson, Curtis R. Reitz, Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Robert
Haydock, Jr. (emeritus), William E. Hogan (emeritus), Homer Kripke (emeritus),
and William J. Pierce. Id. app. I, at 1309.
216 Summers, "Good Faith"in General Contract Law, supra note 4, at 195, 19798, 233.
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specific duty or obligation under the contract, constitutes a
breach of that contract or makes unavailable, under the
particular circumstances, a remedial right or power. This
distinction makes it clear that the doctrine of good faith merely
directs a court towards interpreting contracts within the
commercial context in which they are created, performed, and
enforced, and does not create a separate duty of fairness and
reasonableness which can be independently breached. 217
This language is now part of the official comments to revised
Article 1 section 1-304.218
Here, as with the comment to Restatement Second section
205 discussed above, 2 19 it is possible to see the ability of the
implied obligation of good faith to confound and confuse contract
law. On the one hand, the text of the U.C.C. asserts that there is
an "obligation" of good faith. Commentary No. 10, on the other
hand, says that the obligation is not capable of being breached,
apart from a breach of the contract, so as to give rise to a cause of
action. What is one to make of an unenforceable obligation? The
commentary tells us that the obligation is relevant only in the
process of interpreting the agreement so as to effectuate the
reasonable expectations of the parties. But how does the good
faith obligation aid contract interpretation? Two passages from
the revised official comment suggest the peril in so approaching
the good faith obligation. The first passage asserts that "a failure
to perform or enforce, in good faith, a specific duty or obligation
under the contract, constitutes a breach of that contract or makes
unavailable, under the particular circumstances, a remedial right
or power."220 Reading the foregoing sentence, but omitting the
clause "in good faith," does not seem to change its meaning in
any way with respect to performance. A failure to perform a
specific duty or obligation under a contract is a breach of that
contract. The absence of good faith makes the breach no less or
more a breach. If anything, the sentence seems to suggest the
clearly erroneous conclusion that there can be no breach of the
contract if the actor has acted in good faith. The other aspect of
the sentence-that a failure to enforce a duty or obligation in
good faith makes a remedy unavailable-is no less troublesome,
217
218
219
220

U.C.C. app. I, at 1315; see also id. § 1-304 cmt. 1.
Id. § 1-304 cmt. 1.
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
U.C.C. § 1-304 cmt. 1.
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but in a different way. By positing that the actor is attempting to
enforce a duty or obligation under the contract, it seems
reasonable to presume that such duty or obligation has been
breached. 22 1 If that is the case, then the comment seems to
suggest that even if the contract has been breached, a remedy
will not be available if the breach is not asserted in good faith.
Interpreted this way, the comment is far from trivially true (the
case with the provision with respect to good faith performance).
Here the suggestion is that the breaching party can defend on
the ground that the victim of the breach is not acting in good
faith in claiming a remedy. Providing that failure to enforce in
good faith is an independent ground for excusing performance
seems inconsistent with the main thrust of the comment that no
222
independent cause of action exists for bad faith performance.
It is hard to imagine why the PEB would bury such a significant
principle of law in an amendment to the official comments having
to do with whether the breach of the duty of good faith is
actionable. But what else could the language of the comment
mean?
The second troublesome passage from the amended official
comment is that "the doctrine of good faith [as opposed to
creating a separate duty of good faith] merely directs a court
towards interpreting contracts within the commercial context in
which they are created, performed and enforced."2 23 Much of
Commentary No. 10 is devoted to reviewing various U.C.C.
221 If the obligation or duty is not breached, no remedy should be available
regardless of the good faith or bad faith of the actor.
222 One group of cases that involve this issue has to do with the perfect tender
rule of the U.C.C., which permits a buyer, unless otherwise agreed, to reject goods
that "fail in any respect to conform to the contract." U.C.C. § 2-601(a). A variety of
specific statutory exceptions apply to the rule. But if no explicit exception exists, a
question can arise whether a buyer can only reject in good faith. Some courts have
suggested that failure of a perfect tender gives the buyer an absolute right to reject
regardless of its motives, others have suggested that if the rejection is motivated by
a desire to avoid the deal rather than with dissatisfaction with the nonconformity,
the implied covenant of good faith is violated. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS,

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-3(b)

(4th ed. 1995). The preferable

method of deciding these cases is to focus on the "otherwise agreed" exception to the
perfect tender rule, rather than on the question of good faith. Based on familiar
principles of interpretation and gap-filling, it should be determinable whether the
agreement precluded a pretextual rejection. Dissatisfaction with the draconian
policy behind the perfect tender rule is a separate issue, and should not be a basis,
under the guise of good faith, for stripping a buyer of a statutorily-granted right of
rejection.
223 U.C.C. § 1-304 cmt. 1.
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provisions relating to how an agreement is interpreted and
enforced, including the provisions with respect to trade usage,
course of dealing, course of performance, and the weight accorded
these factors relative to each other and to the express language of
the agreement.
In view of these elaborate provisions
determining commercial context that are part of the statutory
law, why is it necessary to have another provision that "merely
directs a court towards interpreting contracts" in accordance with
the statute? What Commentary No. 10 brings most clearly to
mind is Professor Burton's suggestion that if the purpose of the
doctrine of good faith is simply to justify contract interpretation
so as to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the parties, the
doctrine has no "mission" that justifies its existence.
The third question raised by the U.C.C. good faith provision
concerns the parties' ability to eliminate or modify the duty by
agreement. Section 1-302(b) provides that the duty of good faith
cannot be disclaimed, but the agreement of the parties "may
determine the standards by which the performance of [the good
faith obligation] ... is to be measured if those standards are not
manifestly unreasonable." 224 Professors Burton and Farnsworth
have both criticized this provision's ambiguity and limitation on
individual autonomy, 225 but still another question arises from the
interaction of this provision with Commentary No. 10. Based on
the commentary and the revised official comment to the provision
imposing the good faith obligation, we now know that it is not
possible to independently breach the obligation of good faith.
Rather, the obligation simply directs a court's attention to the
principles of interpretation embraced by the U.C.C., the most
important of which are the language of the agreement, trade
usage, course of dealing, and course of performance. 226 Of course,
at the outset it is hard to imagine parties providing in their
agreement that it can be performed or enforced in bad faith. But
they might provide that "a court interpreting this agreement
shall disregard the question whether a party has performed or
enforced in good faith." Since such a provision would negate the
interpretation of good faith set forth in Commentary No. 10, it
Id. § 1-302(b).
Burton, Good Faith Performance, supra note 4, at 25 (proposing revision of
nondisclaimability provision); Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance, supra note 4, at
676-78.
226 See U.C.C. § 1-303.
224
225
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would seem that such a provision would be invalidated by section
1-302(b). The official comments to the U.C.C. parol evidence
rule, however, provide that the parties to an agreement may
negate a court's ability to interpret the agreement in light of
trade usage, course of dealing, or course of performance. 227 If the
parties can negate these contextual factors of interpretation, why
cannot they also negate a rule that directs a court's attention to
such factors? If so, there is little or nothing left to the domain of
the nondisclaimability of good faith. Of course, it may be argued
that the nondisclaimability provision nevertheless has meaning
since it prevents the parties from negating the express terms of
their agreement, and no provision or comment of the U.C.C.
provides that the parties may negate the language of their
agreement.
Perhaps, then, this is the role of the
nondisclaimability provision-to invalidate a contract term
providing that "no court shall interpret this agreement in
accordance with its terms."
CONCLUSION

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
originated in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries,
primarily in the common law of New York. It has been suggested
in this Article that its origination was a reaction to the rigid
interpretation and parol evidence rule of formalist jurisprudence.
The implied covenant gave the New York courts a way to achieve
a reasonable result without rejecting well-embedded precedent.
Despite the receptivity of New York courts (and a few others) to
the covenant, for the first fifty years or so of its existence it was
not widely recognized and was not included in Restatement First.
Then, embraced by Karl Llewellyn, the principal draftsman of
the U.C.C. and a great believer in fairness and reasonableness in
commercial transactions, the implied covenant found its way into
the major commercial statute of the Twentieth Century and
subsequently into Restatement Second. The implied covenant
quickly gained prominence in the law of contracts-it became
part of the common law of most states and is frequently raised in
commercial litigation in a variety of contexts; it also became the
subject of a small avalanche of law review articles seeking to
define its meaning, role, and scope.
227

Id.

§ 2-202

cmt. 2.
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This Article has sought to establish that the addition of the
covenant to the law of contracts has not, by and large, been
helpful. One reason for this is that imposing an unbargained for
covenant of good faith and fair dealing on contracting does not
necessarily mesh with the principle of individual autonomy. This
problem can be seen clearly in the contrasting positions of
Another
Professors Burton and Summers discussed above.
reason why the covenant has not been as helpful is its potential
to confuse and sometimes misdirect contract disputes that should
be resolved by familiar principles of interpretation and gapfilling. At least in jurisdictions that have abandoned the plain
meaning rule and a restrictive parol evidence rule, the covenant
is no longer necessary to reach the sensible results it helped to
achieve in the early common law of New York.
Professor Glanville Williams observed that there are three
categories of implied contract terms. 228 The first category is
terms that the parties actually intended to be part of their
contract, but for some reason or other did not expressly state.
The second is terms that the parties overlooked but probably
would have included had they considered the issue addressed by
such implied terms. The third is terms imposed by the court for
reasons of policy or fairness, or in obedience to rules of law.
Professor Williams believed that the three categories of implied
terms merge into each other "because the distinguishing factor,
that of probable intent, is a matter of degree." 229 This latter
observation may be valid as a generalization, but it is arguable
that the implied covenant of good faith may fit within his third
category only, and that the justification for including it there is
precarious.
Imagine an empirical study that asks three questions of
parties to written contracts. The first question would be: "Would
a contract provision stating that 'The parties to this contract will
perform their respective obligations and enforce their respective
rights in good faith' accord with your actual intent?" The second
question would be: "In what way does the promise to perform
and enforce in good faith differ from the promise to perform and
enforce in accordance with the terms of the contract?" The third
question would be: "Why did your contract omit an explicit
228

(1945).
229

Glanville L. Williams, Language and the Law-IV, 61 L.Q. REV. 384, 401
Id.
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promise to perform and enforce in good faith?" Although a
majority of the answers to the first question might be "yes," a
majority of the answers to the second and third questions likely
would be "I don't know."
Experienced lawyers would probably agree that they recall
few, if any, contracts that expressly include a general covenant of
good faith. What can explain such an omission if implication of a
general covenant of good faith is to be based on the actual intent
of contracting parties? Could it be that parties never include
such a covenant because they rely on the law to imply it? This
seems highly doubtful. Contracts, especially those drawn by
lawyers, frequently contain explicit provisions that the law would
otherwise imply. This is true even of the good faith covenant, but
only with respect to specific promises, not as a universal contract
requirement.
For example, standard real estate contracts
frequently include a provision permitting the buyer to cancel the
contract in the event that he or she is unable to obtain a
mortgage. Often, these mortgage contingency provisions are
coupled with an express requirement that the buyer will make
good faith efforts to apply for and obtain a mortgage. Such an
express good faith requirement is unnecessary since it would be
implied, but is nevertheless included. Yet such contracts do not
include a general provision requiring good faith performance and
enforcement of all contract obligations and rights.
It seems probable that a general covenant of good faith is
omitted from contract terms for two reasons. The first reason is
that parties to a contract do not really care about the faith of the
other party-good or bad. All they care about is that the other
party will perform as intended. If it is intended that a particular
performance be made in good faith (as in the mortgage
contingency provision) a specific provision is included, but as a
general requirement applying to all contract obligations and
rights there is no such intent. The second, and more important,
reason that a general covenant of good faith is omitted from
contract terms is because such a provision is affirmatively
undesirable. Ambiguity in contract provisions is, unfortunately,
inevitable, but it is usually not desirable or desired. Clearly,
If I am obligated to render a
good faith is ambiguous.
performance under a contract should I be liable for a breach if I
perform, but not in good faith? Or if I have a right under a
contract, should I be precluded from exercising such a right if I
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do not do so in good faith? The reduction of the clarity of contract
provisions and the enhancement of the possibility of contract
disputes has probably led parties to reject including general good
faith covenants in contracts, and therefore there is no basis for
implying such a covenant based on supposed actual or presumed
intent.
What then of good faith as an implied term required by
fairness, policy, or established law? Established law, of course, it
is, but should it be? Broadly speaking, two justifications are
offered for the implied covenant of good faith. The first, based on
the writings of Professors Farnsworth, Burton and others, and
reflected in the official comments to the U.C.C., is that implied
good faith is a useful justification or tool for protecting the
justified or reasonable expectations of contracting parties by the
implication of terms to fill gaps or resolve ambiguities. It has
been argued here that modern interpretation and gap-filling
techniques, as embodied in Restatement Second and the U.C.C.,
provide a more rational and principled basis for resolving
interpretative issues that inevitably arise in express agreements,
shackled as they are to the inherent imprecision in language and
the fallibility of human drafting. Moreover, the implied covenant
of good faith, the meaning of which is widely disputed, is far from
a harmless duplication of interpretative principles and actually
and gap-filling
interpretation
may subvert appropriate
techniques. The second justification for an implied obligation of
good faith, based on the writings of Professors Summers and
Hillman, and to a lesser extent on the comments to Restatement
Second, is that the implied covenant is justified only in part by
its protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties. It is
also based on notions of morality that may apply to defeat party
expectations. Professor Summers also argues that implied good
faith should apply to contract negotiation and formation as well
230
as to performance and enforcement.
No view is expressed here as to whether good faith should be
required in contract negotiation and formation other than to
observe that Professor Summers' view generally does not apply in
this country although it may in others. 231 On the other hand,
there seems to be scant justification for an implied covenant in

230
231

Summers, "Good Faith"in General ContractLaw, supra note 4, at 220-34.
See id. at 198.
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policing behavior once a contract is formed. If the contract is a

fair one, the principle of individual autonomy should require that
it be enforced without the uncertainties that would be created by
enabling a party disadvantaged by enforcement of the deal to
claim bad faith as a defense. If the contract is unfair, the
unconscionability doctrine is the existing and appropriate tool for
relieving the disadvantaged party.
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